WUNDERKAMMER

Chapter1: Introduction

China has had a huge army since its history began.  From the era of Sanguozhi to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the army has always been regarded as the main military force of China.  The reason why China has kept a huge army is that major threats typically have come from the northern border of China.  As the Great Wall indicates, the equestrian peoples such as the Mongolians and the Manchurians had attacked the mainland of China from the north and the Chinese had to prepare for them by maintaining an army.  Of course, this does not mean that China has not held any naval power in its history.  Actually, the Chinese people traveled to Africa during the Ming Dynasty. ^[1]Kataru hasegawa, “China’s Military Threat,” in Thinking Japanese New Security, ed. Masahiro Sakamoto and Tadamasa Fukiura (Tokyo: Jiyu-Kokuminsya, 2004), 291.  According to Hasegawa, the … Continue reading  Though people know this historical fact, their primary concern has been China as a land power state, seeing its navy as relatively weak or small, when compared with its army.

Today, the Communist government is building a modern Navy and trying to expand its active area from the South and East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. ^[2]“China Suggests Dividing the Pacific ocean?” Sankei WEB, 20 August 2007, http://www.sankei.co.jp/kokusai/usa/070820/usa07820001.htm. Also Yoichi Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, … Continue reading  The government has the plan to introduce a new aircraft carrier, and bought Russian submarines, as well as its the second generation of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. ^[3]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 3-4.  Also, Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval … Continue reading  Why is China starting to build a modern navy now?  It is true that the progress of the Chinese navy has been behind that of the US Navy, the Japanese Marine Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and the Taiwan Navy in modernization; and that these three marine forces have tremendous influence over the East and South China Sea, which are China’s closest seas.  The US Navy, the strongest of the three, has influence in the two huge oceans surrounding East Asia: the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.  Moreover, the power of the Indian Navy, which succeeds from the Indian Loyal Navy of the colonial era, cannot be ignored.  What is the strategy of Chinese navy in such a situation, and how does it challenge them?

Before discussing these points, the basic concepts of power, sea strategy, the importance of maritime affairs and Sinocentrism need to be reaffirmed.  First, the concept of realist theory needs to be discussed, because it might be the best way to explain China’s behavior.  The realists believe that 1) the states are the main actors in the international affairs, 2) primarily, it is the international system that affects the behaviors of states, and 3) each state behaves to gain more power.   ^[4]John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Tokyo: Satsuki-Shobo, 2007), 37-38.  Other states are potential threats in this system, so that states cannot trust each other, and try to have more power to get better position to survive.  In short, its own power is the only thing to trust.  So, what is the state’s power?  John J. Mearsheimer defined that power of a state has “latent power” and “military power.” ^[5]Mearsheimer, 87.  According to him, “latent power” is the power to create “military power,” and “military power” is purely power of military based on the size and strength of each force, though they do not always link with each other.   ^[6]Mearsheimer, 87-88.  He used the today’s Japanese status as an example of this.  Japan has tremendously economic power and high technology, but it is not militarily powerful since it has … Continue reading  Now, these definitions need to be applied to the maritime affairs.

Straightforwardly, the power on seas is called sea power.  If we apply the definition of Mearsheimer on maritime affairs, “latent power” is the scale of maritime activities and oceanic territory, and ”military power” is directly the power of naval force.  Combining them, Yoichi Hirama defines the sea power as “the maritime power combined by political power, technological power, and military power to advance the national interests, to achieve the national goals, and the national policy.” ^[7]Yoichi Hirama, “The Value of Sea Power, Especially Naval Power,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_senryaku_kaiyou.htm.

In short, “latent power” means the economic power at seas.  First, seas are important for a state because they are the major field of transportation.  Alfred Thayer Mahan described that seas are highways since there are many specific routes, and he pointed out that the maritime trade is much cheaper and easier, which is still true in the twenty first century. ^[8]Also it is important that heading any direction as people want is possible on seas.  There is no obstacle there, but people have certain roots.  This is way Mahan called them “highways.”  … Continue reading  These highways are called sea-lanes.  Sea-lanes are crucial for many states to develop their economies, because they are free while they make it possible to transport enormous amounts of resources, goods and foods. ^[9]Yoichi Hirama, “The Japanese Security Issues on the Sea Lane in the 21st Century,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, … Continue reading  Especially in this era of globalization, the importance of sea-lanes is increasing.  Second, the latent power includes the natural resources under the water, which promise an economic advantage.  As technology has advanced, people find tremendous amounts of natural resources under the sea.  Such resources include petroleum, natural gas, and other rare metals. ^[10]Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, Military Strategy.”  Moreover, it is possible to build power plants in a sea by using the power of wave and heat today. ^[11]Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, Military Strategy.”  Therefore, having more maritime territory means that the state has more chance to develop.  Both sea-lanes and the oceanic territory are economically important.

On the contrary, “military power” at sea is used to protect latent power.  Major missions of navies during peacetime are to protect the sea-lanes and territory, while major missions at wartime are to keep the command over the seas. ^[12]Mahan.  This does not mean that the navy has to get the control all over the sea for all time during a war, but it needs to keep the control of key places, because it makes harder for the enemy to access the strategically important points or impossible to go out from ports. ^[13]Mearsheimer, 124.  Also, Corbett clearly stated, “Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes.” Julian … Continue reading  Moreover, a key maritime strategy of navies is to control the enemy by controlling his system of trade. ^[14]J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, (Tokyo: Fuyo-Shobo, 2007), 159.  He thinks this type of control is still useful even though it is the era of the nuclear weapons and … Continue reading  Since the latent power, which is usually the basis of military power, is dependent on the economic situation, controlling the enemy’s economy is a powerful method to control the enemy itself. ^[15]Wylie supported this point as he claimed, “The influence of trade and its sea lane is tremendous (Wylie, 149).”  Blockade is one of these tactics that a Navy can take at wartime to control the enemy.  As Mahan called it “the most shocking characteristic of sea power”, the blockade intends to cut off the trade line so that the enemy cannot sustain his economy; moreover, it sometimes causes movements in the enemy to stop the war, because the people of the enemy might support their government less with worse living environment from lack of commodities. ^[16]Mearsheimer, 126.  In any case, because many states depend on sea-lanes, any form of attack on them has tremendous influence on the enemy.

At last, the characteristics of the Chinese are also important to discuss about the Chinese Navy, as Mahan listed the national characteristics as a important factors to calculate a state’s sea power. ^[17]Mahan. 1.geographical position, 2.physical conformation, 3.extent of territory, 4.number of population, 5.national character, and 6.character of the government are six points Mahan listed as … Continue reading  China is basically the land power state which is always under the threat to be invaded.  Briefly, the characteristics of land power states are authoritarian, closed, and tendency to military power, because of the surrounding environment that has constant threats from its neighbors. ^[18]Moreover, such a state adopts the draft system and Army has the first propriety.  Yoichi Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia from Viewpoints of Geopolitics and History,” Laboratory of … Continue reading  Furthermore, the one party system under the Communist Party enhances these characteristics.

With these environment, the Chinese people have a sense of narcissism while their long history has enforced it. ^[19]Hasegawa, 289.  The simplest example of this philosophy is the name of the country as the “center of the world.” ^[20]Hasegawa, 289.  Also Zbigniew Brzeinski, The Grand Chessboard, (Tokyo: Nikkei Bussiness Jin-Bunko, 2003), 257.  Other countries around China are more barbaric and inferior to them, and so that they cannot be equal.  The trade between China and these inferior states is not equal, as only the Chinese Emperor can admit it.  Even the industrialized Britain, which obviously had more power than China, was treated in this way.  Furthermore, this idea brings China the ambiguity of its border, since all countries around it must be followers of China as they welcome to be a part of great China. ^[21]Hasegawa, 289-290.  From the viewpoint of Chinese people, if the state adapts the Chinese culture, the land should be under the control of China. ^[22]Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”  According to Hawsegawa, the Chinese history textbook includes Korea, Okinawa (Liu Chui), Taiwan, Singapore, Murray Peninsula, Vitnam, Tailand, … Continue reading  In other words, China traditionally has had the idea that “mine is mine. Yours is mine, too.”  Today, this idea of ambiguous territory is called “strategic zone” which is similar to the Nazis’ Lebensraum theory in the Chinese governmental documents. ^[23]Hasegawa, 303.  Also, Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 9.  Zbigniew Brzezinski supported that many Chinese have this idea, as he reported that there is an elevation of nationalism in China these days. ^[24]Brzezinski, 256.  The last 150 years was the period of humiliation by the defeat of the Opium War, followed by the unequal trade treaties with Britain and the military invasion by Japan.  Now, Chinese people think that they are strong enough to wipe the dark history off, and the ones who had humiliated China must be punished. ^[25]Brzezinski, 257.  Also Huntington, 168 and 229.  Furthermore, for the Chinese, peace can be accomplished under the hegemony of China. ^[26]Hasegawa, 289.  Also Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”  Without taking into account these unique Chinese characteristics, it is hard to predict China’s true goal.  But because they are consistent with the realists’ power theory, China’s national character is also important to understand the theory behind the policy.

More militarily, characteristics of the political leaders have strong influence on People’s Liberation Army’s Navy’s (PLAN) development.  This is because the military forces in China are under the Communist Party.  In other words, the PLA is not military force for the citizens of China; it is for the Chinese Communist Party to promote its Socialism revolution. ^[27]Hasegawa, 292.  Also, Rollie Lal, Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 114.  As Mao insisted, “political power comes from the barrel of the gun,” the Chinese politics and military are combined together. ^[28]Hasegawa, 292.  In addition to the political-military tie, there is also strong economic-military tie, too (People’s Liberation Army, China, National Defense 2006 (Beijing: GPO, 2006), Section6).  Therefore, the political decisions are for the military goals, and the military strategies are for the political goals.  The Communist Party control military affairs as well as other organizations of the government, and the military have to obey its order. ^[29]Hasegawa, 292.  The Central Military Commission (CMC) has power that “deciding on the military strategy and operational guidelines of the armed forces, directing and administering the deployment … Continue reading  To prove this point, the party commissar is assigned to each individual military unit. ^[30]Hasegawa, 292.  As figure1 shows, the Central Military Commission (CMC), controls all PLA sections.  The CMC of the People’s Republic of China (the state, not the party) is composed of exactly the same members as the CMC of the Communist Party of China. ^[31]People’s Liberation Army, Section3.  In this way, the Party controls the armed forces, even though the professionalization and modernization in the PLAN have caused less loyalty to the Party. ^[32]When it was founded, the same person occupied the political and military leadership so that the relation between the politics and the military was strong.  Today, many people do not dependent on … Continue reading  In addition, the PLAN is under the PLA’s control as its name proves. ^[33]Hasegawa, 292.  This is the proof how the leaders have seen the PLAN.  The Navy is less important then the Army; this has been the basis of the Chinese military affairs.

Having explored basic concepts in Chapter1, the rest of this paper discusses the Chinese Navy as follows.  Chapter2 will present the brief history of the PLAN and the present situation of the PLAN such as its structure, its strategy, and its major activities.  Then Chapter3, Chapter4, and Chapter5 consider the impact of PLAN’s build-up on Taiwan, Japan, and India.  At last, the PLAN’s challenge to the American Naval dominance in East Asia will be discussed in Chapter6.