第2章 The People’s Liberation Army’s Navy of China: Its Strategies and Impacts on the Neighbors

Chapter2: History of the PLAN and Its Missions

To discuss how the PLAN has developed is important in this research.  Without comparing with its past, it is hard to understand how rapidly the PLAN is developing in recent years, and how much its strategy has changed.  Briefly, the PLAN experienced two very different periods: Mao Zedong’s period, and post-Mao’s period.

1)    Mao’s Period

As Bernard D. Cole declared, “the Communist victory in 1949 was an Army victory.” [1]Cole,16.  Moreover, most wars that the Communist government had experienced during the Mao’s period were land wars (Cole, 8).  The Communist party had only an army through the civil war.  Even though the Japanese came from the ocean during 1930s-first 1940s, the main battlefield was the Chinese land, so that the Chinese did not have any sufficient naval power. [2]If China had had the strong naval power, it might be able to suffer the Japanese military forces, by blockading the supply line from Japan to the continent.  However, China could not afford it with … Continue reading  After the civil war, the Communist party established the first navy (the East China People’s Navy) to compete with the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Navy in Taiwan, and soon it modified into People’s Liberation Army’s Navy in 1950 with the assistance of the Soviet Union. [3]Cole, 17.  As symbolizing the Navy’s position under the Army, the first commander of the PLAN was Xiao Jingguang, who was a revolutionary officer with no experience in navy. [4]Cole, 17.  At that time, the Kuomintang Navy was superior to the PLAN, so PLAN’s main mission was only to defend the coastal line with the pragmatic strategy. [5]Cole, 16.  Simultaneously, however, the Communist government’s final goal was to seize Taiwan. [6]Cole, 18.  It is, from the Chinese viewpoint, a province, not a state.  In Taiwan, there are people who share the Chinese culture, so that they should be under the same central government (in this case, under the Communist Party).  Mao claimed that a strong navy was needed to defeat the imperialists, but there were many problems to accomplish its goal. [7]Cole, 162-163.  It does not mean that Mao wanted the blue ocean fleets.  The Korean War did not change the leaders’ viewpoint that the coastal defense was enough to counter against the American … Continue reading  First of all, the Navy did not have modern ships and trained personnel. [8]Cole, 19.  Most ships were collected from the Navy of Republic of China and the commercial vessels with various mechanisms from various countries. [9]Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.4,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_kenkan_c_4.html.  Moreover, the plan to purchase vessels from foreign countries was failed as the Korean War broke out. [10]Cole, 17.  Most personnel are from the PLA, and had never been trained as naval men.  This situation was also caused by the lack of naval experience for almost a hundred years.

In addition, Mao’s preferences strongly influenced the PLAN. [11]Cole, 20.  Also, Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 62.  Because the Maoists had emphasized more on the soldier’s ideological spirit than the modernization of military, the PLAN could not develop its size and weaponry. [12]Cole, 23.  As mentioned above, the Navy needed both trained personnel and modern vessels; with Maoism, the PLAN could get neither.  Moreover, becoming the nuclear power influenced the naval modernization. [13]Cole, 23.  If a state has the nuclear weapons, it gets the deterrence against foreign states.  In other words, no state wants to risk being target of a nuclear weapon; therefore it could be the perfect deterrent.  Even though submarines could have an important role in the nuclear strategy, this new weapon did not contribute to the actual development of the Navy. [14]Cole, 23.  The leaders thought the strong Army and the nuclear power were enough to defend China.

At last, the Communist government itself was unstable during 1950s-1970s. [15]In 1953, China’s First-Five-Year Plan began.  It is the Soviet model collectivization of farms and industries.  It had changed the Chinese economic system.  Also during the early 1950s, … Continue reading  In such situation, it is hard to develop a modern navy for China.  In short, the theory of People’s War was adopted as the naval strategy in this period; the coastal defense was the major goal of the PLAN, and the lack of modernized vessels and trained personnel was caused by the Korean War and domestic instability. [16]Hasegawa, 298.  But these burdens had mostly eliminated after 1976 with both domestic and international changes.

2)    Post-Mao’s Period

Under an increasing threat from the Soviet’s Navy, and supported by domestic stability under Deng Xiaoping, the PLAN finally was able to take on an important role in China’s security strategy.  First, the Soviet power became the serious threat after the split of 1960. [17]This event caused the end of Soviet assistance.  Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.6,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, … Continue reading  Under Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, whose theory was that strong navy is the basis to be the super power, the Soviet Union attempted to build a strong fleet which covered all over the world. [18]Cole, 164.  Also, Peter Howarth, China’s Raising Sea Power: the PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 26.  With this increasing threat from the Soviet Navy, the Chinese leaders started to consider the protection of its sea-lane and natural resources under the water, as its economy grew. [19]Cole, 26.  In addition, after the Vietnam War, the leaders changed its strategy from guerrilla warfare to modernization. [20]Hasegawa, 298.  The government finally realized the importance of modern weapons, and fortunately they could afford to modernize the military at that time.  Moreover, this was the first time China concerned on the dispute territory connecting with the natural resources. [21]Cole, 164.  Also, Kane, 63.  In 1980s, PLAN showed its intention to seize islands in the South China Sea (Cole, 25).  The modernization of the PLAN and the expansion of its activities accreted in 1980s.

Again, how the party leaders see the PLAN and the importance of maritime affairs influences its size and strategy.  For example, because the leaders think the maritime communication is important economically, and the future war would be naval, the PLAN seems to receive quite a big amount of budget, even though the PLAN is relatively small in size compared with whole PLA. [22]Cole, 68, 180.  Also, You Ji, “China’s Naval Strategy and Transformation,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. … Continue reading  Military modernization is another example of the political influence over the military affairs.  Because the Communist government is afraid the foreign interventions that is for human right issues, environmental issues and Taiwan issues, the PLA seeks the modernization of defense system. [23]Lal, 91-94.  It can be the proof that the Chinese government thinks the nuclear power would not deter the conventional war anymore.  Nevertheless, a fear of losing the political power forms the government’s basic strategies. [24]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6.  The Communists’ ideology does not provide national unity anymore, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic reforms in China and the Tiananmen demonstrations. [25]Lal, 63.  Also, Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Dioayn Islands,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The … Continue reading  For the legitimacy of the government, the Communist Party must find new strategies to boost people’s support.  For example, even though the economic reforms that are based on the free market system pose a different direction from the communists’ ideology, the government needs to advance them to sustain its legitimacy. [26]Lal, 65-68.  The military strength is used in the same way.  Since nationalism prevails among the Chinese, the Communist government has to show its ability as the great state through its military strength.  In addition, Chinese self-image is also important because it is the basis how China behaves.  As mentioned in chapter1, the Chinese people think their country has been a great power over its history.  This perspective is enhanced by the rapid economic development and taking important roles in many occasions such as the recent six-party talks on Korea or in the ASEAN organization.  Therefore, the Chinese leaders naturally think that military power needs to be advanced as China gains increasing status in international society and the national interest. [27]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7.  Perhaps, they also might think the guerilla warfare would not suit with the mighty China, because it is supposed to be the tactics of the weak.  China is not weak anymore.  In short, the Chinese policy on the oceans is influenced by its trade driven economic development and nationalism.

The discussion on the naval development strategy, the importance of maritime communication, and the defense of interest in oceans became intense in the1980s. [28]Hasegawa, 298-299.  In the 1990s, the coastal defense strategy expanded to the offshore defense strategy as the Chinese economy and the maritime communication had expanded. [29]US Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 24-25.  Also, Hasegawa, 299.  The PLAN’s missions in the offshore defense are to defend against invasion from ocean, to protect its territory and maritime interest, and to unify the motherland (Taiwan). [30]US Office of Naval Intelligence, 25.  Also, Hasegawa, 302.  More broadly, China sets three-steps to their strategic goals.  The first goal is to have ability to win middle-size limited war by 2005; then the second is to have a space defense system by 2015; and the third is to have military power which can have an influence on international affairs as the United States by 2050.   [31]Hasegawa, 198.  In the National Defense of China 2006, this three-step goal is written in more ambiguous language.  For example, the first step is “to lay a solid foundation” of modernization … Continue reading  Even though the second step does not relate with the Navy, the other two steps cannot be achieved without the naval power.  The PLAN’s role in the Chinese grand strategy is significant.  In other words, the naval strategy is central to the national strategy for China today.

However, because the PLA is the military for the Party, it cannot abandon the slogan of “People’s War,” so that the theory of Communism and Socialism could be a burden on the military development and modernization, as it was during the Mao’s period. [32]Hasegawa, 293.  In other words, if the PLA ever abandons the slogan, the military force is not under the Party anymore, and such situation would happen only after the huge social changes.  Right now, the modernization of the military is in tension with the Army’s ideology as much as the economic system is.

The officer who had most influence on new strategy is Liu Huaqing, who was the Commander-in-Chief of PLAN from 1982 to 1988 and the vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to 1997. [33]Cole, 26, 165-166.  Also, Howarth, 25-26, and Kane, 62.  Liu was originally from the PLA’s Second Field Army, which characteristics were pro-modernization and professionalism under the party commissar, Deng Xiaoping. [34]Howarth, 25.  He studied in Leningrad in early 1950s under Gorshkov. [35]Howarth, 26.  Influenced by him, Liu claimed that the oceans are getting more strategic importance; the maritime affairs are essential for the national economy, and to support the affairs, the strong navy is needed. [36]Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”

Liu determined two important lines for the Chinese naval strategy.  They are called the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain (Figure2).  These lines are still basic concepts today.  The First Island Chain is from Japan to the Philippines along the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan. [37]Cole, 166.  For the PLAN, this line could be called the strategic zone, or the lebensraum, because there is a territorially ambiguous area along the Chinese border where many states insist sovereignty over islands and borders, and this area is the life line to keep the sea-lane safe, to sustain economic development, therefore to keep society stable under the communist Party.  Today, China still does not control the whole of it, because of the presence of Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. [38]Howarth, 86.  To control this line is the most important mission for the PLAN to accomplish the national security goal. [39]The PLA’s mission is to provide ìthe guarantee for maintaining China’s security and unity, and realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way (People’s … Continue reading

The second Island Chain is from Japan to Australia through the Marianas. [40]Cole, 166.  Since China does not control the First Island Chain yet, Beijing plans it might be about 2020 to seize the control of this area. [41]Cole, 166.  Of course, it will be hard to achieve for the PLAN.  The PLAN’s intention to expand its power over this area means that the United States would withdraw from Asia, and Japan would just see the American withdrawal without any action. [42]Howarth, 42.  Also, Cole, 167.  In today’s situation, this is unlikely to happen.  China has too many obstacles: the U.S. and Japan.  Moreover, China would also have to seize Taiwan first to control the first Islands Chain.  In any case, it is sure that China is trying to control the two lines.

With these concepts, the structure of the PLAN seems to be based on the First Islands Chain.  The PLAN has five branches (submarines, surface forces, naval aviation, coastal defense, and marine crops) in three fleets-North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. [43]Cole, 82-23.  The North Sea Fleet covers northern half of Yellow Sea, the East Sea Fleet’s area of responsibility is the southern half of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, and the South Sea Fleet covers the South China Sea to Vietnam. [44]US Office of Naval Intelligence,1.  Also Cole, 82-23.  See Figure3.  Each fleet has important roles.  For example, the North Sea Fleet is nearest to Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Navy based in Japan.  Taiwan is in the area where the East Sea Fleet has responsibility.  At last, the South Sea Fleet covers the dispute islands in the South China Sea such as Spratly Islands.  Tactically, the PLAN might take sea blockade, anti-sea-lanes campaign against the enemy, landing on the enemy’s territory campaign, antiship campaign, Chinese sea-lane defense, and naval base defense with these three fleets. [45]US Office of Naval Intelligence, 27.

As a whole, the most important trend of PLAN’s mobilization is deployment of modern submarines. [46]Eight new submarines in 2005, and seven in 2006.  Many of them are from Russia (O’Rourke, 8).  Today, most Chinese submarines are old, noisy and slow, even though its number is large.  New … Continue reading  Submarines are different from other ships because of their stealth and surprise tactics. [47]Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001,” International Security 11, no.2 (1986-1987): 94, http://proxy.mbc.edu:2054/search/AdvancedSearch.  These tactics allow submarines to harass the maritime commerce and to deploy the nuclear ballistic missiles, besides other basic missions such as coastal defense. [48]Lauthenschlager, 101-102.  With these reasons, deploying of submarines by China has tremendous impact on its neighbor states, because they might threat on their sea-lane and cities without being noticed.  In short, their mission is independent from the actual control of the seas. [49]Lauthenschlager, 109.  Also, Howarth, 69.  Even though a state has the maritime control militarily, submarines can sneak in.  To prevent it, a state has to have the modern anti-submarine sonar sufficiently.

The Chinese fleets, including both submarines and surface ships, are aimed to gain these Chinese national interests: protection of the sea-Lane and coastal defense, natural resources in ocean, and territorial sovereignty.  The rest of this chapter will focus on each of them.

a) Protection of Sea-Lane and Coastal Defense

Protection of the sea-lanes and coastal defense has become more important as the Chinese economy has grown.  Because the Chinese government gains legitimacy through this economic boom, the government wants to sustain the growth.  Today, China is one of the largest exporting and importing countries in the world. [50]China is ranked as the third in both exports and imports of merchandise.  World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: China,” World Trade organization, … Continue reading  Moreover, the mass production as the world’s factory is based on the energy.  In other words, “no energy, no products.”  Therefore, Chinese strategy is influenced by the high degree of energy dependence on the foreign countries. [51]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8.

Security on import of oil is most important because oil is absolutely needed for the economy of China. [52]Coal is the easiest energy resource for China (actually 70% of primary energy are from coal) since China is self- sufficient in it.  However, it causes serious environmental problems such as air … Continue reading  China did not need to import oil till 1993; now, China is the second biggest importer of it following the United States. [53]Calder, 3.  Also, Kane, 64.  Even though China actually has huge amounts of oil (and coal), it is still not efficient because of the lack of infrastructure and the investment. [54]Calder, 5-6.  According to Cole, China is the fifth largest oil producer (Cole, 55).  So, importing from other states is much easier.  Moreover, because of the economic growth, the affluent Chinese consume more energy than before.  This situation that oil is dependent on the sea-lane is the major concern for many Chinese.  Of course, the sea-lane is not only for oil.  It is also for the trade of products.  Because the major imports come from the Persian Gulf, the defense of the sea-lane that passes through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea is crucial for PLAN. [55]Howarth, 26.  In addition, this line connects the trade with Europe, too.  Especially the Strait of Malacca is important because there might be a possible terrorist attack there aimed to destroy the economic system in the world.  At the same time, the presence of the US Navy is uncomfortable for China.  The US Navy controls over the sea-lane and if it wants, it is possible to blockade the Chinese trade line. [56]Calder, 10.  Since it is easy to estimate that China will need more oil for its economic growth, and that Chinese dependence on the sea-lane will increase as the amounts of trade increase, China tries to insure its security.  Being blockaded is a nightmare for the Communist government, so that it is logical strategy to make the Navy capable to secure the sea-lane and its maritime commerce.  In addition, protecting the sea-lane means protecting the coastline, because it is the one end of the sea-lane. [57]Cole, 169.  Since most big cities are located along the coast, protecting them against direct attack and blockade derives from the same reason of protection of the sea-lane.  Potential destruction of these centers of commerce is also a nightmare for the Chinese government.

b) Natural Resources in Ocean

The natural resources under the water are another reason why the PLAN is expanding its mission.  Such resources especially petroleum and natural gas might fulfill the shortage of energy resources. [58]Cole, 55.  Furthermore, because the Chinese worry about the dependence on the sea-lane which is under the US control, having energy providers in its own territory seems a good idea.  Both the East and South China Seas are said to have tremendous amounts of natural resources. [59]Cole, 58-59.  According to Hasegawa, it is said that there is a large amount of petroleum (25 billions tons) and natural gas (8,400 billions cubic meter) in the East China Sea (Hasegawa, 288).  If the PLAN could control these areas completely, China could get stable reserves of natural resources.  Moreover, the international instability causes anxiety in China.  Russia is a possible provider of oil, because it is close to China and there is no need to depend on the US dominated sea-lane.  But Russia is still unstable and its infrastructure is wearing out.  Imports from Central Asian states cause the same concern, as does the Middle East. [60]Cole, 62.  China wants to find a stable natural resources provider.  In addition to energy resources, the seas provide food.  China is the world’s biggest seafood producer today, and it is predictable that there are more needs as both economy and population grows. [61]Cole, 64.  The Chinese government itself is trying to preserve East and South China Seas from overfishing, but the need for seafood keeps growing. [62]Cole, 38.  Thus, China might need to expand its fishery area into outer oceans.  Actually, China has many fishing disputes with its neighbors.  In any case, the Chinese government finds the importance in the oceanic territory.  As the security reason, controlling more sea territory seems better to sustain the economy and population.

c) Territorial sovereignty

At last, the territorial sovereignty is one of the major missions of the PLAN.  The PLA officers have strong feelings that they are defending the Chinese territory and the national interests. [63]Cole, 133.  Furthermore, some Chinese claim the Chinese sovereignty over small islands and oceanic territory regardless how the international laws define them. [64]Cole, 30.  This feeling might grow with the Chinese nationalism: taking back the missing territory proves China’s might and economic growth.  In addition, since today’s international law determines the right of economical activities around the islands, there is more chance to expand the right over the natural resources.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China ratified in 1996, determines a contiguous zone as area where a state can control in certain cases of security, an exclusive economic zone as area where a state can exploit the economic rights, and a continental shelf as the sea-bed beyond the territorial sea with the right of exploitation of natural resources (but states have no right on the surface and airspace above the continental shelf). [65]Cole, 31-32.  With this law, having sovereignty over islands means that a state can gain tremendous economic benefits.  Combining the nationalism and the economic reason, the PLAN has preceded the claim sovereignty over the dispute areas and then actually occupied them. [66]There is the pattern that the PLAN takes to get the control over the dispute areas: claim of sovereignty, research, deployment of fleets, and then actual occupation (Hasegawa, 315).  Also, the … Continue reading  Moreover, to affirm Chinese sovereignty over disputed islands, the government passed “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” in 1992, which includes Taiwan, the Penghu, Dangsha, Senkaku(Diaoyu), Paracel, Spratly and other islands in the South China Sea as Chinese territory. [67]Cole, 34.  Most disputes with other neighbors are islands in the East and South China Seas where is important for the security of the sea-lane and the coast, and natural resources.

These are reasons why the PLAN expands its activities.  Since both East and South China Seas are not so big, such activities of the PLAN have influences on the other states in Asia which also consider the benefit and security of the seas as important.  From next chapter, how this PLAN’s strategy and activities have impact on the neighbor states will be discussed.

 

References

References
1 Cole,16.  Moreover, most wars that the Communist government had experienced during the Mao’s period were land wars (Cole, 8).
2 If China had had the strong naval power, it might be able to suffer the Japanese military forces, by blockading the supply line from Japan to the continent.  However, China could not afford it with the unstable society. Later the United States did this instead of China during the Second World War.
3, 4, 10 Cole, 17.
5 Cole, 16.
6 Cole, 18.
7 Cole, 162-163.  It does not mean that Mao wanted the blue ocean fleets.  The Korean War did not change the leaders’ viewpoint that the coastal defense was enough to counter against the American invasion (Cole, 163).  In other words, Mao wanted a strong defense navy, which was enough to conquer Taiwan.
8 Cole, 19.
9 Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.4,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_kenkan_c_4.html.
11 Cole, 20.  Also, Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 62.
12, 13, 14 Cole, 23.
15 In 1953, China’s First-Five-Year Plan began.  It is the Soviet model collectivization of farms and industries.  It had changed the Chinese economic system.  Also during the early 1950s, intellectuals became the target of suppression.  This movement is called the Hundred Flowers Campaign, and caused the collapse in education system.  In the late 1950s, Mao advocated the Great Leap Forward, which caused disaster.  During 1958 to 1962, 20-30 millions of people died for starvation.  Because of this, Mao’s political power was declining in the early 1960s, but he came back to his position by leading the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted until Mao’s death in 1976.  As a whole, these movements destroyed education system, executed intellectuals and political leaders, and caused social instability (Albert Craig, The Heritage of Chinese Civilization, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Peason, 2007), 166-170).
16, 20 Hasegawa, 298.
17 This event caused the end of Soviet assistance.  Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.6,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_kenkan_c_6.html.
18 Cole, 164.  Also, Peter Howarth, China’s Raising Sea Power: the PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 26.
19 Cole, 26.
21 Cole, 164.  Also, Kane, 63.  In 1980s, PLAN showed its intention to seize islands in the South China Sea (Cole, 25).
22 Cole, 68, 180.  Also, You Ji, “China’s Naval Strategy and Transformation,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. Lawrence W. Parabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2006), 80.
23 Lal, 91-94.  It can be the proof that the Chinese government thinks the nuclear power would not deter the conventional war anymore.
24 US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6.
25 Lal, 63.  Also, Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Dioayn Islands,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 44-45.
26 Lal, 65-68.
27 US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7.
28 Hasegawa, 298-299.
29 US Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 24-25.  Also, Hasegawa, 299.
30 US Office of Naval Intelligence, 25.  Also, Hasegawa, 302.
31 Hasegawa, 198.  In the National Defense of China 2006, this three-step goal is written in more ambiguous language.  For example, the first step is “to lay a solid foundation” of modernization (People’s Liberation Army, Section2).
32 Hasegawa, 293.
33 Cole, 26, 165-166.  Also, Howarth, 25-26, and Kane, 62.
34 Howarth, 25.
35 Howarth, 26.
36 Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”
37, 40, 41 Cole, 166.
38 Howarth, 86.
39 The PLA’s mission is to provide ìthe guarantee for maintaining China’s security and unity, and realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way (People’s Liberation Army, Section2.).î Specifically, the China’s National Defense 2006 lists, “This includes guarding against and resisting aggression, defending against violation of China’s territorial sea and air space, and borders; opposing and containing the separatist forces for ìTaiwan independenceî and their activities, taking precautions against and cracking down on terrorism, separatism and extremist in all forms (People’s Liberation Army, Section2)”.
42 Howarth, 42.  Also, Cole, 167.
43 Cole, 82-23.
44 US Office of Naval Intelligence,1.  Also Cole, 82-23.  See Figure3.
45 US Office of Naval Intelligence, 27.
46 Eight new submarines in 2005, and seven in 2006.  Many of them are from Russia (O’Rourke, 8).  Today, most Chinese submarines are old, noisy and slow, even though its number is large.  New modern submarines will eliminate these disadvantage as a submarine (Howarth, 16).
47 Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001,” International Security 11, no.2 (1986-1987): 94, http://proxy.mbc.edu:2054/search/AdvancedSearch.
48 Lauthenschlager, 101-102.
49 Lauthenschlager, 109.  Also, Howarth, 69.
50 China is ranked as the third in both exports and imports of merchandise.  World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: China,” World Trade organization, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=CN.
51 US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8.
52 Coal is the easiest energy resource for China (actually 70% of primary energy are from coal) since China is self- sufficient in it.  However, it causes serious environmental problems such as air pollution and green house effect.  Nuclear plants are possible for the future, but the government is afraid of its cost to build and security.  Oil is regarded as the most stable for the industry today (Kent C. Calder, “China’s Energy Diplomacy and Its Geopolitical Implications,” Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series, no.3, (Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, 2006, 4, 17-18, and 20).
53 Calder, 3.  Also, Kane, 64.
54 Calder, 5-6.  According to Cole, China is the fifth largest oil producer (Cole, 55).
55 Howarth, 26.  In addition, this line connects the trade with Europe, too.
56 Calder, 10.
57 Cole, 169.
58 Cole, 55.
59 Cole, 58-59.  According to Hasegawa, it is said that there is a large amount of petroleum (25 billions tons) and natural gas (8,400 billions cubic meter) in the East China Sea (Hasegawa, 288).
60 Cole, 62.
61 Cole, 64.
62 Cole, 38.
63 Cole, 133.
64 Cole, 30.
65 Cole, 31-32.
66 There is the pattern that the PLAN takes to get the control over the dispute areas: claim of sovereignty, research, deployment of fleets, and then actual occupation (Hasegawa, 315).  Also, the Chinese government takes the stance that any dispute should be solved in the bilateral meetings (Cole, 37, and Hasegawa, 315).  This makes possible for China to get more benefits with its military capability than the multilateral conventions.
67 Cole, 34.

Leave a Reply