WUNDERKAMMER

Chapter3: Impact on Taiwan

Taiwan receives the biggest and most direct influence by the expansion of the PLAN.  This is not only because the Communist government regards Taiwan as a part of their sovereignty, and it does not allow the independence of Taiwan, but because Taiwan is located at the geopolitically important point for China’s expansion to the outer oceans.  Basically, the PLAN has two routes to access to the Pacific Ocean: the Okinawa Islands and Taiwan. ^[1]Hasegawa, 294.  However, it is almost impossible to seize the control over the Okinawa Islands because they are legally the Japanese territory and there are substantial bases of the U.S. forces.  On the other hand, Taiwan is located only 150 kilometers away from the Chinese coast occupied by the same Chinese.  From the Chinese perspective, they have right to control the island, because Taiwan is under the Chinese culture.  In addition, Taiwan’s control on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is also attractive for the PLAN, because they are located at the middle of the sea-lane in the South China Sea. ^[2]Hasegawa, 294.  Also, US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 22.　In other words, control over the Taiwan sovereignty does not mean only to get access to the Pacific Ocean, but it will be the big step to win the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea.  Seizing Taiwan has also strong political message to other separation movements in China such as Tibet. ^[3]Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no.5 (1996): http://proxy.mbc.edu:2108/pqdweb?RQT=306&TS=1192760580&clientId=52920.  Because the Taiwan issue is the most visible to the international society, the Communist government might be able to eliminate resistance in the other areas after they achieve control of Taiwan.  If even Taiwan could not keep independent, how can small minority groups achieve it?  In this way, seizing Taiwan can be the first big step to achieve the PLAN’s strategic goal and the national interest.

As the practical means, there are three tactics the PLAN can take against Taiwan: amphibious assault, blockade, and missile strike. ^[4]Cole, 155.  The first one must be the last option for the PLAN, because it needs many vessels and people, which is more than the PLAN’s capability, and there are few landing points in both sides of Taiwan coasts. ^[5]Howarth, 48.  Also, Cole, 155.  According to Cole, the Taiwan Strait itself is the burden for the invasion.  The PLAN has to calculate its high winds and seas with many typhoons (Cole, 155).  In … Continue reading  In this case, Taiwan forces can anticipate the possible routes the PLAN will take and can counterfight easily.  Geographically, in short, Taiwan Island is hard to invade.  In addition, there is no sign that the PLAN is building any type of fleet (merchant and naval vessels) to achieve the invasion. ^[6]Howarth, 49.  This means that the PLAN will not have ability to invade in the near future.  Of course, the PLAN cannot ignore the Taiwan Navy.  Because the PLAN has not accomplished to seize the sea control over the Straits yet, the Taiwan Navy might win at the battle, or at least the Taiwan Navy survive to bother the invasion. ^[7]Cole, 155.  In any case, the amphibious assault costs too much for both sides of the straits, and it is not a possible choice that Beijing will choose in close future. ^[8]Howarth, 49.  Therefore, the PLAN has two options left: blockade and missile strikes.  The latter option sounds easier, but they are not accurate yet. ^[9]Cole, 157.  Moreover, no one knows how much the Taiwan people can resist against them. ^[10]Cole, 157.  In short, missile strikes are great gamble for China in many ways.

In this way, blockade is the most possible in the three choices.  Even though blockade is not perfect, the fear to be blockaded is enough to evoke concern about the sea power for both the people and the government. ^[11]Measheimer, 127-132.  For example, Mearsheimer himself think the blockade does not work without corresponding land power.  He explained this point with the example of the Japanese defeat at the end … Continue reading  Taiwan does not have any energy resources except for the nuclear power, and its economy is dependent on the trade. ^[12]Michael C. Grubb, “Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” Naval War College Review 60, no.1 (2007): 88, … Continue reading  Also, blockade against Taiwanese ports is very easy.  As mentioned above, Taiwan has natural limits to build a port; therefore, there are only two important commercial ports in the west coast (Chinese side).  Therefore, the PLAN can use the tactics to blockade ports besides the blockade of the sea-lanes. ^[13]Cole, 156.  This tactics is same with the military reason.  As Okumura described with examples of Spanish-American War (blockade of Santiago by Mahan) and Russo-Japanese War (blockade of Lushun by … Continue reading  In addition, Taiwan is in the Chinese territory, so that the PLAN could mine and blockade without violation of the international law. ^[14]Cole, 156.    Therefore, blockade needs fewer vessels, costs and efforts to defeat Taiwan than the other two choices, and this blockade theory fits Sun Zi’s “subduing the enemy without any battle,” which is the Chinese basic military strategy throughout its history. ^[15]Howarth, 140.  Also, the Taiwan Navy and the U.S. Navy in Asia have small capability of anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare (Howarth, 51 and Cole, 157).  This fact makes the blockade more possible … Continue reading

As the PLAN increases its size and expands its area of activity, Taiwan is more threatened.  The PLAN wants this island for several reasons; it is a national goal to annex the island under the Communist’s government; it is strategically important to take control over the island to get access to the Pacific Ocean; and it will be a strong message to other separatists in China.  However, taking control over the island is not so easy yet.  Right now, the PLAN has only ability to blockade Taiwan, and it is still not sure whether this could work as the PLAN initially intends, because Taiwan can stockpile the energy resources, and because there is possibility of air supplies, as the U.S. did for Western Germany during the Cold War. ^[16]Cole, 157-158.  Moreover, the PLAN cannot ignore the US power in the East China Sea.  If China launches un-peaceful seizure of Taiwan, the U.S. (and possibly the international society) must react. ^[17]Howarth, 55.  Also, US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 33.  But before the discussion how the US dominance actually influences on this issue, let’s focus on two other major naval powers in the Asia: Japan and India.