第4章 The People’s Liberation Army’s Navy of China: Its Strategies and Impacts on the Neighbors

Chapter4: Impact on Japan

Japan once dominated  whole area of the East and South China Seas and the west Pacific Ocean.  If people think the economical growth is the reason of the PLAN’s expansion, it is natural that Japan has modern and strong maritime forces with its strong economic power.  Historically, Japan has been a strong sea power.  With little natural resources, maritime trade, fishery and shipbuilding industry has contributed to have the strong naval force. [1]Cole, 150.  Today, the JMSDF inherits the legacy of the Japanese Imperial Navy, even though its size and mission has changed significantly. [2]It is well-known story in Japan that the JMSDF is officially proud of the history of the Japanese Imperial Navy.  For example, the JMSDF uses the same flag and songs with its former Navy.  Also, … Continue reading  Under the Article 9, the JMSDF determines its missions as “effective response to the new threats and diverse situations,” “proactive efforts to improve the international security environment,” and “preparation for full-scale invasion.”  [3]Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, “Mission of JMSDF,” JMSDF, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/english/index02.html. The first two missions indicate that the JMSDF is a force for the international security, but the Japanese worry about activities of their neighbor states more than terrorism, as the last mission suggests.

First of all, the Japanese leaders’ viewpoints over the Asian security issues are quite cynical.  They assume that the situation is less stable than in the Cold War era with many considerations. [4]The Korean Peninsula (including the North Korea’s nuclear issues and the unclear unification process), the Taiwan Straits, and the sea-lane are main concern for Japan (Robert G. Sutter, China’s … Continue reading  Moreover, the Japanese society became more conservative after the Gulf War, and the support for the Self Defense Forces (SDF) is increasing steadily.  When the Gulf War broke out, the Japanese government decided to send money but not the personnel.  While it was the best Japan could do at that time, since there was no law that allows the SDF to go oversea for any kind of activity, it caused the accusation from the international society.  In response to this, the government enacted the PKO (peace keeping operation) cooperation law on June 19, 1992.  This law allows sending the SDF troops to oversea for humanitarian purposes under the United Nation.  From this point, the SDF has expanded its activities.  In addition to the PKO missions, North Korea has also generated the public trend to more conservative direction.  The 1998 missile tests shocked the Japanese society because it crossed over the Japanese islands.  Furthermore, two suspicious ships entered into the Japanese territory secretly and shot against the JMSDF and the Coast Guard in 1999.  These two incidents and other disasters such as the great earthquake and the terrorism targeting the Tokyo metro subway system by the Aum Sinrikyo in 1997 make people think that the SDF is the force to save people.  In addition to North Korea, the PLAN’s aggressive behaviors have also provoked the caution in Japan.  Even though the PLAN does not have the capability to invade Japan, many Japanese have seen the PLAN’s activities with suspicion. [5]Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Regional Military Posture,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 274.  China’s … Continue reading  This trend became the rigid basis of expansion of the SDF missions after 9.11.  First, Prime Minister at that time, Junichiro Koizumi, organized more laws which make the SDF complete missions more smoothly and provide more opportunity abroad.  By the law enacted in 2003, the SDF was sent to Iraq.  Of course, this is not only for the U.S. and the war against terrorism, but it is more to advance Japanese national interests. [6]Japan does not see this as a chance to fill the regional power vacuums or to counter China directly (Mike M. Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium,” in Power … Continue reading  The Japanese people have never suffered from the Islam terrorists, and religion is not so important for many Japanese as for followers of Islam or Christianity.  On the other hand, oil is important for the economy, but many think to stabilize the Middle East for oil is not their responsibility. [7]Perhaps, they do not care whether the United States controls over the area or Islam-Arab states do, as long as the price of oil is acceptable.  As a result of assisting the U.S. forces, however, the JMSDF has expanded its activity area to the Indian Ocean.  This is quite an uncomfortable situation for the PLAN, while Japan also feels uncomfortable with the PLAN’s expansion.  This is simply because they share the same sea-lane.  Therefore, the Japanese leaders assert the PLAN’s expansion same as the Taiwan government; it is a potential threat for its sea-lane, and they are afraid of possibility of blockade by the PLAN.  The Japanese economy depends on trade significantly, and the PLAN’s sphere of activities occupies quite a large portion from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. [8]Eric Grove, “Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 26. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges,” 43. And Hideaki Kaneda, “Japan’s … Continue reading  Moreover, the PLAN has shown its intention to find the route to the Pacific Ocean through the Japanese islands by sending submarines and intelligence ships around Japan. [9]Kaneda, 125.  According to Kane, the PLAN vessels violated Japan’s EEZ 17 times in the first half of 2000 (Kane, 116).  This is enough to evoke fear in the Japanese people.  At last, the PLAN’s strategy of the Second Islands Chain is not acceptable for Japan, because it means that all Japanese EEZ would be under the PLAN’s control.

The possibility of blockade is what Beijing fears, too.  Moreover, for the Communist government, which gained public support through fighting against Japan during 1930-40s, the stronger Japanese military power can be the chance to enhance its legitimacy and military activities. [10]Hasegawa, 323.  Also, Thomas J. Christensen, “China; the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), … Continue reading  As the JMSDF becomes more powerful concerning the PLAN’s expansion, the PLAN seeks more power to compete with the JMSDF.  In addition, there are competitions over the natural resources in the East China Sea.  As the United Nations reported that there is possibility of tremendous natural resources under the water in 1968, the Chinese government suddenly started to claim its sovereignty over the area. [11]Hasegawa, 316.  Such territorial disputes between China and Japan still exist.  In this situation, both naval powers see each other as their potential rival.

Japan is the powerful sea power, who dominated Asia once, and this fact is enough for the PLAN to assume that Japan is the most serious threat in the Asian states.  Still, the JMSDF is the most modern and powerful force in Asia except for the US Navy, and the PLAN needs more than 20 years to match it. [12]Cole, 149.  Especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and electronic warfare (Calder, 26).  Whether the JMSDF can benefit from this advantage or not would depend on the public support of the Japanese people for the security in Asia.  If the PLAN is perceived as serious threat for the Japanese security and economy, the JMSDF would expand its missions significantly over the Asian seas.

References

References
1 Cole, 150.
2 It is well-known story in Japan that the JMSDF is officially proud of the history of the Japanese Imperial Navy.  For example, the JMSDF uses the same flag and songs with its former Navy.  Also, the first generation of JMSDF was the former naval officers.  This is because the naval force needs more professional personnel than the land force (the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force was founded with the former policemen, not military officers).
3 Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, “Mission of JMSDF,” JMSDF, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/english/index02.html.
4 The Korean Peninsula (including the North Korea’s nuclear issues and the unclear unification process), the Taiwan Straits, and the sea-lane are main concern for Japan (Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lamham: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 132-133.  Also, Japan Ministry of defense, Defense of Japan 2007 (Tokyo: GPO, 2007), 2).  It is interesting to compare that the Chinese government sees Asian security environment as stable (People’s Liberation Army, Section1).
5 Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Regional Military Posture,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 274.  China’s nuclear tests, clashes with the Philippines and Vietnam, the territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands and military exercise toward Taiwan are included.
6 Japan does not see this as a chance to fill the regional power vacuums or to counter China directly (Mike M. Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 145).  It is motivated mainly to keep the U.S.-Japan alliance.
7 Perhaps, they do not care whether the United States controls over the area or Islam-Arab states do, as long as the price of oil is acceptable.
8 Eric Grove, “Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 26. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges,” 43. And Hideaki Kaneda, “Japan’s National Maritime Doctrines and Capabilities,” 124.  All in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. Lawrence W. Parabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2006).
9 Kaneda, 125.  According to Kane, the PLAN vessels violated Japan’s EEZ 17 times in the first half of 2000 (Kane, 116).
10 Hasegawa, 323.  Also, Thomas J. Christensen, “China; the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), 140.
11 Hasegawa, 316.
12 Cole, 149.  Especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and electronic warfare (Calder, 26).

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