第5章 The People’s Liberation Army’s Navy of China: Its Strategies and Impacts on the Neighbors

Chapter5: Impact on India

The PLAN’s expansion also influences India, which shares only land border, but not the oceanic one.  Historically, the confrontation between them happened along their land border.  But their naval rivalry also has increased as the PLAN expands to the Indian Ocean.  Because the Indian Ocean is ”away” for the PLAN, the confrontation involves some other countries.

At first, the relation between China and India is different from the relation between China and Taiwan or Japan, because India is a member of the nuclear club.  Therefore, China concerns most the Indian nuclear capability and cannot ignore the their reaction. [1]Cole, 171.  Also, John W. Garver, “China’s Influence in Central and South Asia: Is It Increasing?,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University … Continue reading  Moreover, since they do not share the oceanic border, the naval confrontation is not so obvious yet.  It is easy to understand that the PLAN, which has difficulty to seize the control even in the First Islands Chain, cannot have a full influence in the Indian Ocean.  The PLAN, however, enhances its capability in this area steadily.  Today’s situation can be said that both sides are cautious with each other, avoiding direct rivalry.

At the same time the PLAN develops its capability, India has also modernized its military capability to deal with China and Pakistan. [2]Swaine, 278.  The Indian Navy determines that security of the Indian Ocean is the most important from both national security and economic reason. [3]Lal, 42.  In addition to this kind of common motivation, India also deprives the need of a strong Navy from its history; New Delhi thinks that their lack of sea power caused the colonization of India. [4]Vijay Sakhuja, “Indian Navy: Keeping Pace with Emerging Challenges,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. Lawrence W. … Continue reading  To protect their homeland and national interests, India has developed the Navy.  Compared with the PLAN, however, the Indian Navy is more reactive.  India prefers to use its power to keep the status quo. [5]Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 154.  Therefore, its development is counteracting as the PLAN expands.  Contrary to the Chinese perspective that India is not a threat, India sees China as an aggressive, undemocratic power. [6]Sutter, “China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils,” 240.  Of course, we cannot ignore the fact that there is some patriotism as a great power in India.  Today, the Indian Navy is the largest in the Indian Ocean and they believe that there is their own sphere of influence. [7]Sakhuja, 95 and 112.  Also, Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian ocean,” Naval War College Review 59, no.2 (2006): 60, … Continue reading  From Chinese point of view, this situation that the Indian Navy has strong influence over the Indian Ocean, where more than a half of Chinese sea-lane passes, is uncomfortable, even though the Chinese do not think India will be the possible rival. [8]Sutter, “China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils,” 240.  To change this situation, the PLAN chose to have allies, so that it can have influence over this area.  China’s two allies are Pakistan and Burma.

The Chinese government keeps strong ties with these states, and these ties make possible for the PLAN to have operation in the Indian Ocean with protected ports. [9]Garver, 217. Shift power.  First, the tie between China and Burma is very strong.  While major states imposed sanctions on Burma for its repression against prodemocracy movements, China has offered the protection in the international community, military support, and economic support. [10]Garver, 218-219.  Power shift.  These generous supports produce the strong willingness to follow the Chinese way in the Burmese government.  In return, China enhances the influence in the Bay of Bengal, and it will allow the PLAN to launch into the Indian Ocean. [11]Garver, 219-220.  Also, Cohen, 253-254.  According to Hasegawa, the PLAN built a base in the Great Coco Islands.  India became more cautious toward China, and as a reaction to this, the Indian … Continue reading

Pakistan also provides safe ports for the PLAN.  The link between China and Pakistan has long history (over 40 years). [12]Garver, 213.  The relation is also based on Chinese military supports. [13]Cohen, 209, 259-260.  As China gets naval ports in Burma by providing supports, the PLAN has the safe ports in Pakistan.  For example, the PLAN is constructing a new naval base at Gwadar. [14]Bill Gertz, “China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes,” The Washington Times, January 18, 2005, http://www.gwadarcorner.com.  Also, Prabhakar, 51-52.  With this base, the PLAN will enhance its influence in the eastern Indian Ocean, which is close to the Persian Gulf.

If the PLAN keeps enhancing its power in both Burma and Pakistan territory, the Indian Navy would be sandwiched by the Chinese power, and the Indian sea-lane would be under the PLAN’s control.  India needs to develop its navy to confront this challenge.  However, there are other actors who also have some influence in this area.  Japan is one of them, sending its vessels to support the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Moreover, the U.S., which is the most powerful actor in the whole Asian Seas, cannot be ignored.

References

References
1 Cole, 171.  Also, John W. Garver, “China’s Influence in Central and South Asia: Is It Increasing?,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 221.
2 Swaine, 278.
3 Lal, 42.
4 Vijay Sakhuja, “Indian Navy: Keeping Pace with Emerging Challenges,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. Lawrence W. Parabhakar, Joshua H. Ho and Sam Bateman (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2006), 95.
5 Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 154.
6, 8 Sutter, “China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils,” 240.
7 Sakhuja, 95 and 112.  Also, Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian ocean,” Naval War College Review 59, no.2 (2006): 60, http://proxy.mbc.edu:2263/itx/start.do?prodId=AONE&userGroupName=mbaldwin.
9 Garver, 217. Shift power.
10 Garver, 218-219.  Power shift.
11 Garver, 219-220.  Also, Cohen, 253-254.  According to Hasegawa, the PLAN built a base in the Great Coco Islands.  India became more cautious toward China, and as a reaction to this, the Indian Navy seemed to deploy new fleet in the Andaman Islands (Hasegawa, 312).  Moreover, Beijing precedes construction of a road from southern China to Burma, so that it can be the alternative trade line instead of unsafe Malacca Strait (Prabhakar, 52. Also, Daniel Metraux, China Today (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2007), 124).  However, the relation between India and Burma also has tightened in these days.  In 2004, pro-China Khin Nyunt was placed under house arrest, then the Burmese government has become more generous to India.  For example, they had joint military operations, and became the membership in the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Techinical and Economic Cooperation.  Noteworthy, this organization does not include both China and Pakistan (Berlin, 75).
12 Garver, 213.
13 Cohen, 209, 259-260.
14 Bill Gertz, “China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes,” The Washington Times, January 18, 2005, http://www.gwadarcorner.com.  Also, Prabhakar, 51-52.

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