WUNDERKAMMER

Chapter3: Impact on Taiwan

Taiwan receives the biggest and most direct influence by the expansion of the PLAN.  This is not only because the Communist government regards Taiwan as a part of their sovereignty, and it does not allow the independence of Taiwan, but because Taiwan is located at the geopolitically important point for China’s expansion to the outer oceans.  Basically, the PLAN has two routes to access to the Pacific Ocean: the Okinawa Islands and Taiwan. ^[1]Hasegawa, 294.  However, it is almost impossible to seize the control over the Okinawa Islands because they are legally the Japanese territory and there are substantial bases of the U.S. forces.  On the other hand, Taiwan is located only 150 kilometers away from the Chinese coast occupied by the same Chinese.  From the Chinese perspective, they have right to control the island, because Taiwan is under the Chinese culture.  In addition, Taiwan’s control on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is also attractive for the PLAN, because they are located at the middle of the sea-lane in the South China Sea. ^[2]Hasegawa, 294.  Also, US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 22.　In other words, control over the Taiwan sovereignty does not mean only to get access to the Pacific Ocean, but it will be the big step to win the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea.  Seizing Taiwan has also strong political message to other separation movements in China such as Tibet. ^[3]Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no.5 (1996): http://proxy.mbc.edu:2108/pqdweb?RQT=306&TS=1192760580&clientId=52920.  Because the Taiwan issue is the most visible to the international society, the Communist government might be able to eliminate resistance in the other areas after they achieve control of Taiwan.  If even Taiwan could not keep independent, how can small minority groups achieve it?  In this way, seizing Taiwan can be the first big step to achieve the PLAN’s strategic goal and the national interest.

As the practical means, there are three tactics the PLAN can take against Taiwan: amphibious assault, blockade, and missile strike. ^[4]Cole, 155.  The first one must be the last option for the PLAN, because it needs many vessels and people, which is more than the PLAN’s capability, and there are few landing points in both sides of Taiwan coasts. ^[5]Howarth, 48.  Also, Cole, 155.  According to Cole, the Taiwan Strait itself is the burden for the invasion.  The PLAN has to calculate its high winds and seas with many typhoons (Cole, 155).  In … Continue reading  In this case, Taiwan forces can anticipate the possible routes the PLAN will take and can counterfight easily.  Geographically, in short, Taiwan Island is hard to invade.  In addition, there is no sign that the PLAN is building any type of fleet (merchant and naval vessels) to achieve the invasion. ^[6]Howarth, 49.  This means that the PLAN will not have ability to invade in the near future.  Of course, the PLAN cannot ignore the Taiwan Navy.  Because the PLAN has not accomplished to seize the sea control over the Straits yet, the Taiwan Navy might win at the battle, or at least the Taiwan Navy survive to bother the invasion. ^[7]Cole, 155.  In any case, the amphibious assault costs too much for both sides of the straits, and it is not a possible choice that Beijing will choose in close future. ^[8]Howarth, 49.  Therefore, the PLAN has two options left: blockade and missile strikes.  The latter option sounds easier, but they are not accurate yet. ^[9]Cole, 157.  Moreover, no one knows how much the Taiwan people can resist against them. ^[10]Cole, 157.  In short, missile strikes are great gamble for China in many ways.

In this way, blockade is the most possible in the three choices.  Even though blockade is not perfect, the fear to be blockaded is enough to evoke concern about the sea power for both the people and the government. ^[11]Measheimer, 127-132.  For example, Mearsheimer himself think the blockade does not work without corresponding land power.  He explained this point with the example of the Japanese defeat at the end … Continue reading  Taiwan does not have any energy resources except for the nuclear power, and its economy is dependent on the trade. ^[12]Michael C. Grubb, “Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” Naval War College Review 60, no.1 (2007): 88, … Continue reading  Also, blockade against Taiwanese ports is very easy.  As mentioned above, Taiwan has natural limits to build a port; therefore, there are only two important commercial ports in the west coast (Chinese side).  Therefore, the PLAN can use the tactics to blockade ports besides the blockade of the sea-lanes. ^[13]Cole, 156.  This tactics is same with the military reason.  As Okumura described with examples of Spanish-American War (blockade of Santiago by Mahan) and Russo-Japanese War (blockade of Lushun by … Continue reading  In addition, Taiwan is in the Chinese territory, so that the PLAN could mine and blockade without violation of the international law. ^[14]Cole, 156.    Therefore, blockade needs fewer vessels, costs and efforts to defeat Taiwan than the other two choices, and this blockade theory fits Sun Zi’s “subduing the enemy without any battle,” which is the Chinese basic military strategy throughout its history. ^[15]Howarth, 140.  Also, the Taiwan Navy and the U.S. Navy in Asia have small capability of anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare (Howarth, 51 and Cole, 157).  This fact makes the blockade more possible … Continue reading

As the PLAN increases its size and expands its area of activity, Taiwan is more threatened.  The PLAN wants this island for several reasons; it is a national goal to annex the island under the Communist’s government; it is strategically important to take control over the island to get access to the Pacific Ocean; and it will be a strong message to other separatists in China.  However, taking control over the island is not so easy yet.  Right now, the PLAN has only ability to blockade Taiwan, and it is still not sure whether this could work as the PLAN initially intends, because Taiwan can stockpile the energy resources, and because there is possibility of air supplies, as the U.S. did for Western Germany during the Cold War. ^[16]Cole, 157-158.  Moreover, the PLAN cannot ignore the US power in the East China Sea.  If China launches un-peaceful seizure of Taiwan, the U.S. (and possibly the international society) must react. ^[17]Howarth, 55.  Also, US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 33.  But before the discussion how the US dominance actually influences on this issue, let’s focus on two other major naval powers in the Asia: Japan and India.

Chapter2: History of the PLAN and Its Missions

To discuss how the PLAN has developed is important in this research.  Without comparing with its past, it is hard to understand how rapidly the PLAN is developing in recent years, and how much its strategy has changed.  Briefly, the PLAN experienced two very different periods: Mao Zedong’s period, and post-Mao’s period.

1)    Mao’s Period

As Bernard D. Cole declared, “the Communist victory in 1949 was an Army victory.” ^[1]Cole,16.  Moreover, most wars that the Communist government had experienced during the Mao’s period were land wars (Cole, 8).  The Communist party had only an army through the civil war.  Even though the Japanese came from the ocean during 1930s-first 1940s, the main battlefield was the Chinese land, so that the Chinese did not have any sufficient naval power. ^[2]If China had had the strong naval power, it might be able to suffer the Japanese military forces, by blockading the supply line from Japan to the continent.  However, China could not afford it with … Continue reading  After the civil war, the Communist party established the first navy (the East China People’s Navy) to compete with the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Navy in Taiwan, and soon it modified into People’s Liberation Army’s Navy in 1950 with the assistance of the Soviet Union. ^[3]Cole, 17.  As symbolizing the Navy’s position under the Army, the first commander of the PLAN was Xiao Jingguang, who was a revolutionary officer with no experience in navy. ^[4]Cole, 17.  At that time, the Kuomintang Navy was superior to the PLAN, so PLAN’s main mission was only to defend the coastal line with the pragmatic strategy. ^[5]Cole, 16.  Simultaneously, however, the Communist government’s final goal was to seize Taiwan. ^[6]Cole, 18.  It is, from the Chinese viewpoint, a province, not a state.  In Taiwan, there are people who share the Chinese culture, so that they should be under the same central government (in this case, under the Communist Party).  Mao claimed that a strong navy was needed to defeat the imperialists, but there were many problems to accomplish its goal. ^[7]Cole, 162-163.  It does not mean that Mao wanted the blue ocean fleets.  The Korean War did not change the leaders’ viewpoint that the coastal defense was enough to counter against the American … Continue reading  First of all, the Navy did not have modern ships and trained personnel. ^[8]Cole, 19.  Most ships were collected from the Navy of Republic of China and the commercial vessels with various mechanisms from various countries. ^[9]Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.4,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_kenkan_c_4.html.  Moreover, the plan to purchase vessels from foreign countries was failed as the Korean War broke out. ^[10]Cole, 17.  Most personnel are from the PLA, and had never been trained as naval men.  This situation was also caused by the lack of naval experience for almost a hundred years.

In addition, Mao’s preferences strongly influenced the PLAN. ^[11]Cole, 20.  Also, Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 62.  Because the Maoists had emphasized more on the soldier’s ideological spirit than the modernization of military, the PLAN could not develop its size and weaponry. ^[12]Cole, 23.  As mentioned above, the Navy needed both trained personnel and modern vessels; with Maoism, the PLAN could get neither.  Moreover, becoming the nuclear power influenced the naval modernization. ^[13]Cole, 23.  If a state has the nuclear weapons, it gets the deterrence against foreign states.  In other words, no state wants to risk being target of a nuclear weapon; therefore it could be the perfect deterrent.  Even though submarines could have an important role in the nuclear strategy, this new weapon did not contribute to the actual development of the Navy. ^[14]Cole, 23.  The leaders thought the strong Army and the nuclear power were enough to defend China.

At last, the Communist government itself was unstable during 1950s-1970s. ^[15]In 1953, China’s First-Five-Year Plan began.  It is the Soviet model collectivization of farms and industries.  It had changed the Chinese economic system.  Also during the early 1950s, … Continue reading  In such situation, it is hard to develop a modern navy for China.  In short, the theory of People’s War was adopted as the naval strategy in this period; the coastal defense was the major goal of the PLAN, and the lack of modernized vessels and trained personnel was caused by the Korean War and domestic instability. ^[16]Hasegawa, 298.  But these burdens had mostly eliminated after 1976 with both domestic and international changes.

2)    Post-Mao’s Period

Under an increasing threat from the Soviet’s Navy, and supported by domestic stability under Deng Xiaoping, the PLAN finally was able to take on an important role in China’s security strategy.  First, the Soviet power became the serious threat after the split of 1960. ^[17]This event caused the end of Soviet assistance.  Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.6,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, … Continue reading  Under Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, whose theory was that strong navy is the basis to be the super power, the Soviet Union attempted to build a strong fleet which covered all over the world. ^[18]Cole, 164.  Also, Peter Howarth, China’s Raising Sea Power: the PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 26.  With this increasing threat from the Soviet Navy, the Chinese leaders started to consider the protection of its sea-lane and natural resources under the water, as its economy grew. ^[19]Cole, 26.  In addition, after the Vietnam War, the leaders changed its strategy from guerrilla warfare to modernization. ^[20]Hasegawa, 298.  The government finally realized the importance of modern weapons, and fortunately they could afford to modernize the military at that time.  Moreover, this was the first time China concerned on the dispute territory connecting with the natural resources. ^[21]Cole, 164.  Also, Kane, 63.  In 1980s, PLAN showed its intention to seize islands in the South China Sea (Cole, 25).  The modernization of the PLAN and the expansion of its activities accreted in 1980s.

Again, how the party leaders see the PLAN and the importance of maritime affairs influences its size and strategy.  For example, because the leaders think the maritime communication is important economically, and the future war would be naval, the PLAN seems to receive quite a big amount of budget, even though the PLAN is relatively small in size compared with whole PLA. ^[22]Cole, 68, 180.  Also, You Ji, “China’s Naval Strategy and Transformation,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. … Continue reading  Military modernization is another example of the political influence over the military affairs.  Because the Communist government is afraid the foreign interventions that is for human right issues, environmental issues and Taiwan issues, the PLA seeks the modernization of defense system. ^[23]Lal, 91-94.  It can be the proof that the Chinese government thinks the nuclear power would not deter the conventional war anymore.  Nevertheless, a fear of losing the political power forms the government’s basic strategies. ^[24]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6.  The Communists’ ideology does not provide national unity anymore, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic reforms in China and the Tiananmen demonstrations. ^[25]Lal, 63.  Also, Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Dioayn Islands,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The … Continue reading  For the legitimacy of the government, the Communist Party must find new strategies to boost people’s support.  For example, even though the economic reforms that are based on the free market system pose a different direction from the communists’ ideology, the government needs to advance them to sustain its legitimacy. ^[26]Lal, 65-68.  The military strength is used in the same way.  Since nationalism prevails among the Chinese, the Communist government has to show its ability as the great state through its military strength.  In addition, Chinese self-image is also important because it is the basis how China behaves.  As mentioned in chapter1, the Chinese people think their country has been a great power over its history.  This perspective is enhanced by the rapid economic development and taking important roles in many occasions such as the recent six-party talks on Korea or in the ASEAN organization.  Therefore, the Chinese leaders naturally think that military power needs to be advanced as China gains increasing status in international society and the national interest. ^[27]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7.  Perhaps, they also might think the guerilla warfare would not suit with the mighty China, because it is supposed to be the tactics of the weak.  China is not weak anymore.  In short, the Chinese policy on the oceans is influenced by its trade driven economic development and nationalism.

The discussion on the naval development strategy, the importance of maritime communication, and the defense of interest in oceans became intense in the1980s. ^[28]Hasegawa, 298-299.  In the 1990s, the coastal defense strategy expanded to the offshore defense strategy as the Chinese economy and the maritime communication had expanded. ^[29]US Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 24-25.  Also, Hasegawa, 299.  The PLAN’s missions in the offshore defense are to defend against invasion from ocean, to protect its territory and maritime interest, and to unify the motherland (Taiwan). ^[30]US Office of Naval Intelligence, 25.  Also, Hasegawa, 302.  More broadly, China sets three-steps to their strategic goals.  The first goal is to have ability to win middle-size limited war by 2005; then the second is to have a space defense system by 2015; and the third is to have military power which can have an influence on international affairs as the United States by 2050.   ^[31]Hasegawa, 198.  In the National Defense of China 2006, this three-step goal is written in more ambiguous language.  For example, the first step is “to lay a solid foundation” of modernization … Continue reading  Even though the second step does not relate with the Navy, the other two steps cannot be achieved without the naval power.  The PLAN’s role in the Chinese grand strategy is significant.  In other words, the naval strategy is central to the national strategy for China today.

However, because the PLA is the military for the Party, it cannot abandon the slogan of “People’s War,” so that the theory of Communism and Socialism could be a burden on the military development and modernization, as it was during the Mao’s period. ^[32]Hasegawa, 293.  In other words, if the PLA ever abandons the slogan, the military force is not under the Party anymore, and such situation would happen only after the huge social changes.  Right now, the modernization of the military is in tension with the Army’s ideology as much as the economic system is.

The officer who had most influence on new strategy is Liu Huaqing, who was the Commander-in-Chief of PLAN from 1982 to 1988 and the vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to 1997. ^[33]Cole, 26, 165-166.  Also, Howarth, 25-26, and Kane, 62.  Liu was originally from the PLA’s Second Field Army, which characteristics were pro-modernization and professionalism under the party commissar, Deng Xiaoping. ^[34]Howarth, 25.  He studied in Leningrad in early 1950s under Gorshkov. ^[35]Howarth, 26.  Influenced by him, Liu claimed that the oceans are getting more strategic importance; the maritime affairs are essential for the national economy, and to support the affairs, the strong navy is needed. ^[36]Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”

Liu determined two important lines for the Chinese naval strategy.  They are called the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain (Figure2).  These lines are still basic concepts today.  The First Island Chain is from Japan to the Philippines along the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan. ^[37]Cole, 166.  For the PLAN, this line could be called the strategic zone, or the lebensraum, because there is a territorially ambiguous area along the Chinese border where many states insist sovereignty over islands and borders, and this area is the life line to keep the sea-lane safe, to sustain economic development, therefore to keep society stable under the communist Party.  Today, China still does not control the whole of it, because of the presence of Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. ^[38]Howarth, 86.  To control this line is the most important mission for the PLAN to accomplish the national security goal. ^[39]The PLA’s mission is to provide ìthe guarantee for maintaining China’s security and unity, and realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way (People’s … Continue reading

The second Island Chain is from Japan to Australia through the Marianas. ^[40]Cole, 166.  Since China does not control the First Island Chain yet, Beijing plans it might be about 2020 to seize the control of this area. ^[41]Cole, 166.  Of course, it will be hard to achieve for the PLAN.  The PLAN’s intention to expand its power over this area means that the United States would withdraw from Asia, and Japan would just see the American withdrawal without any action. ^[42]Howarth, 42.  Also, Cole, 167.  In today’s situation, this is unlikely to happen.  China has too many obstacles: the U.S. and Japan.  Moreover, China would also have to seize Taiwan first to control the first Islands Chain.  In any case, it is sure that China is trying to control the two lines.

With these concepts, the structure of the PLAN seems to be based on the First Islands Chain.  The PLAN has five branches (submarines, surface forces, naval aviation, coastal defense, and marine crops) in three fleets-North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. ^[43]Cole, 82-23.  The North Sea Fleet covers northern half of Yellow Sea, the East Sea Fleet’s area of responsibility is the southern half of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, and the South Sea Fleet covers the South China Sea to Vietnam. ^[44]US Office of Naval Intelligence,1.  Also Cole, 82-23.  See Figure3.  Each fleet has important roles.  For example, the North Sea Fleet is nearest to Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Navy based in Japan.  Taiwan is in the area where the East Sea Fleet has responsibility.  At last, the South Sea Fleet covers the dispute islands in the South China Sea such as Spratly Islands.  Tactically, the PLAN might take sea blockade, anti-sea-lanes campaign against the enemy, landing on the enemy’s territory campaign, antiship campaign, Chinese sea-lane defense, and naval base defense with these three fleets. ^[45]US Office of Naval Intelligence, 27.

As a whole, the most important trend of PLAN’s mobilization is deployment of modern submarines. ^[46]Eight new submarines in 2005, and seven in 2006.  Many of them are from Russia (O’Rourke, 8).  Today, most Chinese submarines are old, noisy and slow, even though its number is large.  New … Continue reading  Submarines are different from other ships because of their stealth and surprise tactics. ^[47]Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001,” International Security 11, no.2 (1986-1987): 94, http://proxy.mbc.edu:2054/search/AdvancedSearch.  These tactics allow submarines to harass the maritime commerce and to deploy the nuclear ballistic missiles, besides other basic missions such as coastal defense. ^[48]Lauthenschlager, 101-102.  With these reasons, deploying of submarines by China has tremendous impact on its neighbor states, because they might threat on their sea-lane and cities without being noticed.  In short, their mission is independent from the actual control of the seas. ^[49]Lauthenschlager, 109.  Also, Howarth, 69.  Even though a state has the maritime control militarily, submarines can sneak in.  To prevent it, a state has to have the modern anti-submarine sonar sufficiently.

The Chinese fleets, including both submarines and surface ships, are aimed to gain these Chinese national interests: protection of the sea-Lane and coastal defense, natural resources in ocean, and territorial sovereignty.  The rest of this chapter will focus on each of them.

a) Protection of Sea-Lane and Coastal Defense

Protection of the sea-lanes and coastal defense has become more important as the Chinese economy has grown.  Because the Chinese government gains legitimacy through this economic boom, the government wants to sustain the growth.  Today, China is one of the largest exporting and importing countries in the world. ^[50]China is ranked as the third in both exports and imports of merchandise.  World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: China,” World Trade organization, … Continue reading  Moreover, the mass production as the world’s factory is based on the energy.  In other words, “no energy, no products.”  Therefore, Chinese strategy is influenced by the high degree of energy dependence on the foreign countries. ^[51]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8.

Security on import of oil is most important because oil is absolutely needed for the economy of China. ^[52]Coal is the easiest energy resource for China (actually 70% of primary energy are from coal) since China is self- sufficient in it.  However, it causes serious environmental problems such as air … Continue reading  China did not need to import oil till 1993; now, China is the second biggest importer of it following the United States. ^[53]Calder, 3.  Also, Kane, 64.  Even though China actually has huge amounts of oil (and coal), it is still not efficient because of the lack of infrastructure and the investment. ^[54]Calder, 5-6.  According to Cole, China is the fifth largest oil producer (Cole, 55).  So, importing from other states is much easier.  Moreover, because of the economic growth, the affluent Chinese consume more energy than before.  This situation that oil is dependent on the sea-lane is the major concern for many Chinese.  Of course, the sea-lane is not only for oil.  It is also for the trade of products.  Because the major imports come from the Persian Gulf, the defense of the sea-lane that passes through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea is crucial for PLAN. ^[55]Howarth, 26.  In addition, this line connects the trade with Europe, too.  Especially the Strait of Malacca is important because there might be a possible terrorist attack there aimed to destroy the economic system in the world.  At the same time, the presence of the US Navy is uncomfortable for China.  The US Navy controls over the sea-lane and if it wants, it is possible to blockade the Chinese trade line. ^[56]Calder, 10.  Since it is easy to estimate that China will need more oil for its economic growth, and that Chinese dependence on the sea-lane will increase as the amounts of trade increase, China tries to insure its security.  Being blockaded is a nightmare for the Communist government, so that it is logical strategy to make the Navy capable to secure the sea-lane and its maritime commerce.  In addition, protecting the sea-lane means protecting the coastline, because it is the one end of the sea-lane. ^[57]Cole, 169.  Since most big cities are located along the coast, protecting them against direct attack and blockade derives from the same reason of protection of the sea-lane.  Potential destruction of these centers of commerce is also a nightmare for the Chinese government.

b) Natural Resources in Ocean

The natural resources under the water are another reason why the PLAN is expanding its mission.  Such resources especially petroleum and natural gas might fulfill the shortage of energy resources. ^[58]Cole, 55.  Furthermore, because the Chinese worry about the dependence on the sea-lane which is under the US control, having energy providers in its own territory seems a good idea.  Both the East and South China Seas are said to have tremendous amounts of natural resources. ^[59]Cole, 58-59.  According to Hasegawa, it is said that there is a large amount of petroleum (25 billions tons) and natural gas (8,400 billions cubic meter) in the East China Sea (Hasegawa, 288).  If the PLAN could control these areas completely, China could get stable reserves of natural resources.  Moreover, the international instability causes anxiety in China.  Russia is a possible provider of oil, because it is close to China and there is no need to depend on the US dominated sea-lane.  But Russia is still unstable and its infrastructure is wearing out.  Imports from Central Asian states cause the same concern, as does the Middle East. ^[60]Cole, 62.  China wants to find a stable natural resources provider.  In addition to energy resources, the seas provide food.  China is the world’s biggest seafood producer today, and it is predictable that there are more needs as both economy and population grows. ^[61]Cole, 64.  The Chinese government itself is trying to preserve East and South China Seas from overfishing, but the need for seafood keeps growing. ^[62]Cole, 38.  Thus, China might need to expand its fishery area into outer oceans.  Actually, China has many fishing disputes with its neighbors.  In any case, the Chinese government finds the importance in the oceanic territory.  As the security reason, controlling more sea territory seems better to sustain the economy and population.

c) Territorial sovereignty

At last, the territorial sovereignty is one of the major missions of the PLAN.  The PLA officers have strong feelings that they are defending the Chinese territory and the national interests. ^[63]Cole, 133.  Furthermore, some Chinese claim the Chinese sovereignty over small islands and oceanic territory regardless how the international laws define them. ^[64]Cole, 30.  This feeling might grow with the Chinese nationalism: taking back the missing territory proves China’s might and economic growth.  In addition, since today’s international law determines the right of economical activities around the islands, there is more chance to expand the right over the natural resources.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China ratified in 1996, determines a contiguous zone as area where a state can control in certain cases of security, an exclusive economic zone as area where a state can exploit the economic rights, and a continental shelf as the sea-bed beyond the territorial sea with the right of exploitation of natural resources (but states have no right on the surface and airspace above the continental shelf). ^[65]Cole, 31-32.  With this law, having sovereignty over islands means that a state can gain tremendous economic benefits.  Combining the nationalism and the economic reason, the PLAN has preceded the claim sovereignty over the dispute areas and then actually occupied them. ^[66]There is the pattern that the PLAN takes to get the control over the dispute areas: claim of sovereignty, research, deployment of fleets, and then actual occupation (Hasegawa, 315).  Also, the … Continue reading  Moreover, to affirm Chinese sovereignty over disputed islands, the government passed “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” in 1992, which includes Taiwan, the Penghu, Dangsha, Senkaku(Diaoyu), Paracel, Spratly and other islands in the South China Sea as Chinese territory. ^[67]Cole, 34.  Most disputes with other neighbors are islands in the East and South China Seas where is important for the security of the sea-lane and the coast, and natural resources.

These are reasons why the PLAN expands its activities.  Since both East and South China Seas are not so big, such activities of the PLAN have influences on the other states in Asia which also consider the benefit and security of the seas as important.  From next chapter, how this PLAN’s strategy and activities have impact on the neighbor states will be discussed.

Chapter1: Introduction

China has had a huge army since its history began.  From the era of Sanguozhi to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the army has always been regarded as the main military force of China.  The reason why China has kept a huge army is that major threats typically have come from the northern border of China.  As the Great Wall indicates, the equestrian peoples such as the Mongolians and the Manchurians had attacked the mainland of China from the north and the Chinese had to prepare for them by maintaining an army.  Of course, this does not mean that China has not held any naval power in its history.  Actually, the Chinese people traveled to Africa during the Ming Dynasty. ^[1]Kataru hasegawa, “China’s Military Threat,” in Thinking Japanese New Security, ed. Masahiro Sakamoto and Tadamasa Fukiura (Tokyo: Jiyu-Kokuminsya, 2004), 291.  According to Hasegawa, the … Continue reading  Though people know this historical fact, their primary concern has been China as a land power state, seeing its navy as relatively weak or small, when compared with its army.

Today, the Communist government is building a modern Navy and trying to expand its active area from the South and East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. ^[2]“China Suggests Dividing the Pacific ocean?” Sankei WEB, 20 August 2007, http://www.sankei.co.jp/kokusai/usa/070820/usa07820001.htm. Also Yoichi Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, … Continue reading  The government has the plan to introduce a new aircraft carrier, and bought Russian submarines, as well as its the second generation of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. ^[3]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 3-4.  Also, Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval … Continue reading  Why is China starting to build a modern navy now?  It is true that the progress of the Chinese navy has been behind that of the US Navy, the Japanese Marine Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and the Taiwan Navy in modernization; and that these three marine forces have tremendous influence over the East and South China Sea, which are China’s closest seas.  The US Navy, the strongest of the three, has influence in the two huge oceans surrounding East Asia: the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.  Moreover, the power of the Indian Navy, which succeeds from the Indian Loyal Navy of the colonial era, cannot be ignored.  What is the strategy of Chinese navy in such a situation, and how does it challenge them?

Before discussing these points, the basic concepts of power, sea strategy, the importance of maritime affairs and Sinocentrism need to be reaffirmed.  First, the concept of realist theory needs to be discussed, because it might be the best way to explain China’s behavior.  The realists believe that 1) the states are the main actors in the international affairs, 2) primarily, it is the international system that affects the behaviors of states, and 3) each state behaves to gain more power.   ^[4]John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Tokyo: Satsuki-Shobo, 2007), 37-38.  Other states are potential threats in this system, so that states cannot trust each other, and try to have more power to get better position to survive.  In short, its own power is the only thing to trust.  So, what is the state’s power?  John J. Mearsheimer defined that power of a state has “latent power” and “military power.” ^[5]Mearsheimer, 87.  According to him, “latent power” is the power to create “military power,” and “military power” is purely power of military based on the size and strength of each force, though they do not always link with each other.   ^[6]Mearsheimer, 87-88.  He used the today’s Japanese status as an example of this.  Japan has tremendously economic power and high technology, but it is not militarily powerful since it has … Continue reading  Now, these definitions need to be applied to the maritime affairs.

Straightforwardly, the power on seas is called sea power.  If we apply the definition of Mearsheimer on maritime affairs, “latent power” is the scale of maritime activities and oceanic territory, and ”military power” is directly the power of naval force.  Combining them, Yoichi Hirama defines the sea power as “the maritime power combined by political power, technological power, and military power to advance the national interests, to achieve the national goals, and the national policy.” ^[7]Yoichi Hirama, “The Value of Sea Power, Especially Naval Power,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_senryaku_kaiyou.htm.

In short, “latent power” means the economic power at seas.  First, seas are important for a state because they are the major field of transportation.  Alfred Thayer Mahan described that seas are highways since there are many specific routes, and he pointed out that the maritime trade is much cheaper and easier, which is still true in the twenty first century. ^[8]Also it is important that heading any direction as people want is possible on seas.  There is no obstacle there, but people have certain roots.  This is way Mahan called them “highways.”  … Continue reading  These highways are called sea-lanes.  Sea-lanes are crucial for many states to develop their economies, because they are free while they make it possible to transport enormous amounts of resources, goods and foods. ^[9]Yoichi Hirama, “The Japanese Security Issues on the Sea Lane in the 21st Century,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, … Continue reading  Especially in this era of globalization, the importance of sea-lanes is increasing.  Second, the latent power includes the natural resources under the water, which promise an economic advantage.  As technology has advanced, people find tremendous amounts of natural resources under the sea.  Such resources include petroleum, natural gas, and other rare metals. ^[10]Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, Military Strategy.”  Moreover, it is possible to build power plants in a sea by using the power of wave and heat today. ^[11]Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, Military Strategy.”  Therefore, having more maritime territory means that the state has more chance to develop.  Both sea-lanes and the oceanic territory are economically important.

On the contrary, “military power” at sea is used to protect latent power.  Major missions of navies during peacetime are to protect the sea-lanes and territory, while major missions at wartime are to keep the command over the seas. ^[12]Mahan.  This does not mean that the navy has to get the control all over the sea for all time during a war, but it needs to keep the control of key places, because it makes harder for the enemy to access the strategically important points or impossible to go out from ports. ^[13]Mearsheimer, 124.  Also, Corbett clearly stated, “Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes.” Julian … Continue reading  Moreover, a key maritime strategy of navies is to control the enemy by controlling his system of trade. ^[14]J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, (Tokyo: Fuyo-Shobo, 2007), 159.  He thinks this type of control is still useful even though it is the era of the nuclear weapons and … Continue reading  Since the latent power, which is usually the basis of military power, is dependent on the economic situation, controlling the enemy’s economy is a powerful method to control the enemy itself. ^[15]Wylie supported this point as he claimed, “The influence of trade and its sea lane is tremendous (Wylie, 149).”  Blockade is one of these tactics that a Navy can take at wartime to control the enemy.  As Mahan called it “the most shocking characteristic of sea power”, the blockade intends to cut off the trade line so that the enemy cannot sustain his economy; moreover, it sometimes causes movements in the enemy to stop the war, because the people of the enemy might support their government less with worse living environment from lack of commodities. ^[16]Mearsheimer, 126.  In any case, because many states depend on sea-lanes, any form of attack on them has tremendous influence on the enemy.

At last, the characteristics of the Chinese are also important to discuss about the Chinese Navy, as Mahan listed the national characteristics as a important factors to calculate a state’s sea power. ^[17]Mahan. 1.geographical position, 2.physical conformation, 3.extent of territory, 4.number of population, 5.national character, and 6.character of the government are six points Mahan listed as … Continue reading  China is basically the land power state which is always under the threat to be invaded.  Briefly, the characteristics of land power states are authoritarian, closed, and tendency to military power, because of the surrounding environment that has constant threats from its neighbors. ^[18]Moreover, such a state adopts the draft system and Army has the first propriety.  Yoichi Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia from Viewpoints of Geopolitics and History,” Laboratory of … Continue reading  Furthermore, the one party system under the Communist Party enhances these characteristics.

With these environment, the Chinese people have a sense of narcissism while their long history has enforced it. ^[19]Hasegawa, 289.  The simplest example of this philosophy is the name of the country as the “center of the world.” ^[20]Hasegawa, 289.  Also Zbigniew Brzeinski, The Grand Chessboard, (Tokyo: Nikkei Bussiness Jin-Bunko, 2003), 257.  Other countries around China are more barbaric and inferior to them, and so that they cannot be equal.  The trade between China and these inferior states is not equal, as only the Chinese Emperor can admit it.  Even the industrialized Britain, which obviously had more power than China, was treated in this way.  Furthermore, this idea brings China the ambiguity of its border, since all countries around it must be followers of China as they welcome to be a part of great China. ^[21]Hasegawa, 289-290.  From the viewpoint of Chinese people, if the state adapts the Chinese culture, the land should be under the control of China. ^[22]Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”  According to Hawsegawa, the Chinese history textbook includes Korea, Okinawa (Liu Chui), Taiwan, Singapore, Murray Peninsula, Vitnam, Tailand, … Continue reading  In other words, China traditionally has had the idea that “mine is mine. Yours is mine, too.”  Today, this idea of ambiguous territory is called “strategic zone” which is similar to the Nazis’ Lebensraum theory in the Chinese governmental documents. ^[23]Hasegawa, 303.  Also, Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 9.  Zbigniew Brzezinski supported that many Chinese have this idea, as he reported that there is an elevation of nationalism in China these days. ^[24]Brzezinski, 256.  The last 150 years was the period of humiliation by the defeat of the Opium War, followed by the unequal trade treaties with Britain and the military invasion by Japan.  Now, Chinese people think that they are strong enough to wipe the dark history off, and the ones who had humiliated China must be punished. ^[25]Brzezinski, 257.  Also Huntington, 168 and 229.  Furthermore, for the Chinese, peace can be accomplished under the hegemony of China. ^[26]Hasegawa, 289.  Also Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”  Without taking into account these unique Chinese characteristics, it is hard to predict China’s true goal.  But because they are consistent with the realists’ power theory, China’s national character is also important to understand the theory behind the policy.

More militarily, characteristics of the political leaders have strong influence on People’s Liberation Army’s Navy’s (PLAN) development.  This is because the military forces in China are under the Communist Party.  In other words, the PLA is not military force for the citizens of China; it is for the Chinese Communist Party to promote its Socialism revolution. ^[27]Hasegawa, 292.  Also, Rollie Lal, Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 114.  As Mao insisted, “political power comes from the barrel of the gun,” the Chinese politics and military are combined together. ^[28]Hasegawa, 292.  In addition to the political-military tie, there is also strong economic-military tie, too (People’s Liberation Army, China, National Defense 2006 (Beijing: GPO, 2006), Section6).  Therefore, the political decisions are for the military goals, and the military strategies are for the political goals.  The Communist Party control military affairs as well as other organizations of the government, and the military have to obey its order. ^[29]Hasegawa, 292.  The Central Military Commission (CMC) has power that “deciding on the military strategy and operational guidelines of the armed forces, directing and administering the deployment … Continue reading  To prove this point, the party commissar is assigned to each individual military unit. ^[30]Hasegawa, 292.  As figure1 shows, the Central Military Commission (CMC), controls all PLA sections.  The CMC of the People’s Republic of China (the state, not the party) is composed of exactly the same members as the CMC of the Communist Party of China. ^[31]People’s Liberation Army, Section3.  In this way, the Party controls the armed forces, even though the professionalization and modernization in the PLAN have caused less loyalty to the Party. ^[32]When it was founded, the same person occupied the political and military leadership so that the relation between the politics and the military was strong.  Today, many people do not dependent on … Continue reading  In addition, the PLAN is under the PLA’s control as its name proves. ^[33]Hasegawa, 292.  This is the proof how the leaders have seen the PLAN.  The Navy is less important then the Army; this has been the basis of the Chinese military affairs.

Having explored basic concepts in Chapter1, the rest of this paper discusses the Chinese Navy as follows.  Chapter2 will present the brief history of the PLAN and the present situation of the PLAN such as its structure, its strategy, and its major activities.  Then Chapter3, Chapter4, and Chapter5 consider the impact of PLAN’s build-up on Taiwan, Japan, and India.  At last, the PLAN’s challenge to the American Naval dominance in East Asia will be discussed in Chapter6.

私のハンドルネームのフルネームが「幕の内ゆきを」である事を知っている人は少ないでしょうね・・・ふふふ

と意味深に始めてみましたが、実はaboutの上の方にちゃんと書いてあったりするのです。aboutページを自ら作っておきながら、「こんなもん、別に読まんでも良い」とaboutページに書いてあったりするので、ま、ハンドルネームのフルネームについて、知らなくとも全く構わない、と。ただ、タイトルの語呂的にフルネームの方がシックリきたと、そう言う訳です。

さて、私生活の方は相変わらずです。忙しいといえば、忙しい。ただ、最近は忙しさにかまけて、読書の方を怠っていたので、猛反省して沢山読もうと心に誓っているところです。取り急ぎ、「佐藤優の本を制覇する」という野望を達成すべく、本のリストを作成中です。他にも読みたい本はいっぱい。スターリンとかヒトラーとか、中国共産党（特に周恩来）とかそっち系。あと、国際関係と地政学、読書論、書評の本も読みたいな。そして、毛色が変わるけれども、全米大ヒットの映画「トワイライト」の原作も読んでみたい・・・まぁ、この本は原語で読んでも良いのかも知れないのですけれど。因みに映画そのものについては「エドワード役のロバート・パティンソンはそこまでイケてない」という、ファンのほとんどを敵に回すような感想を抱きました。なんかねー、知り合いに似ているんですよね、あの髪型。しょーもない理由でご免なさい。

んで、「毛沢東の私生活」を旅行中に読み終わったのですが、なんていうのか想像通りでございました、毛主席の私生活って。禁欲を訴える中での女遊び、貧困の中での豪華な料理、パラノイア・・・などなど、「ま、共産党の独裁的主導者ってこんなもんよね」というのが私の感想です。ちょっと内容に関して不満を言えば、もうちょっとくらい文化革命について記述があっても良かったのでは？と。他の政治闘争に比べて、えらくサラッと流された気がします。劉少奇の最後については、確か３行くらいしかなかったぞ。もっと書けば良いのに。その辺の内容の配分からも、また、個々のエピソードからも微妙に筆者の立ち位置が分かるような、分からないような・・・ハッキリ言ってしまえば「筆者自身も、生い立ちの不利をカバーするだけの、毛沢東の主治医としての権威を持っていた」という点がこの本では微妙に隠れているのですよね。そりゃ、共産党権力の中枢では振り回される側に立っていた事は間違いないのでしょうが、中国国民と比べた立ち位置についてはそんなに触れていなかったりする訳です。別にそれでどうこうなる訳ではありませんが、曇った目で読んだので、凄くその辺の違和感を感じてしまいました。もう少し、本を素直に読める人になりたいよ。

それにしても、筆者の「江青嫌い」には笑ってしまうほどでした。まぁ、江青側に問題のほとんどの責任があるのでしょうが・・・同じ共産党独裁者の奥さんとして、江青はナジェージダ・アリルーエワ（スターリンの２番目の奥さん）の爪の垢でも煎じて飲めば良かったんだ。

まず、英語版の卒論、一旦撤回します。別に問題があった訳ではなく、ただ単にやはり日本語訳に直してからアップするのが基本かな？と思い直したので。しかも、来学期入ったら卒論を書き直す予定です。平間洋一先生からアドバイス頂いた部分も直したいし、個人的にあんまりにも未完具合に泣きそう。取り扱い範囲が広いからなぁ。海軍の話なのに、あんまり潜水艦とか領海問題とか触れていませんしね。勿論、高々25〜50枚の卒論な訳ですから、本の情報量を目指してもしょうがないんですけど、何だか悔しいのです。まぁ、本は未来に取っておきますが。

さて、私の卒論は海軍について語っている訳ですが、結論一歩手前では国際関係そのものについて書いているので、結構「中国は脅威か否か」について考える事が出来ました。以下、「脅威論」と「非脅威論」に分けて、それぞれのポイントについて考えてみました。というか、「非脅威論」に対しては反論を展開しています。

一応予備知識として：私自身はリアリストです。リアリストとは、そのままですが国際関係論でいう現実主義者。かのミアシャイマー教授によると

１）世界政治では国家が中心
NGOとか国連とか基本無視。勿論無視しないリアリストもいる・・・はず。ネオリアリストとか色んな派閥に分かれますが、ここでは大まかにミアシャイマー教授の定義に従います。

２）国内情勢は関係なく、国際関係の環境が国の行動に影響を与える
つまり、誰が指導者だろうと、どんな政治形態（独裁とか共産国家とか）でも関係ないってことですね。個人的には、国内情勢（と国民性）を考慮すべき事柄も多いと考えていますが。今回の中国のケースも国民性を考慮しています。

３）国家は生き残る為に互いに競争する
他国の為に譲歩したりはしない、らしい。

という３点が現実主義者の世界の見方らしい。全てちょっとずつですが私の見方とはズレています。上でも書きましたが、私は国民性も考慮すべきだと考えていますし、３番目なんてこう、苦笑いしたくなる感じ。ただし、リアリストかリベラリスト（自由主義者）かといえば、確実にリアリストである、ということです。因みにリベラリストとは、これまたミアシャイマー教授の定義によると

１）国際政治の政治の主役は国家
といってもNGOやグローバリゼーション、国連を考慮に入れる学者もいますし、やっぱり派閥次第ではあります。

２）国内政治の状況はその国の外交政策に影響を与える

３）ある国の政治体制の方が本質的に他の政治体制よりも好ましい
これが民主国家同士では戦争をしないというデモクラティック・ピース理論の元になっています。そして民主主義を広げようとする政策もここから出ている訳ですな。

４）パワーよりも経済とかの方が大事
経済依存が進めば、戦争をするデメリット（経済的打撃）がメリットを越えるって考え方もここから。

という事になりまして、まぁ、基本的にリアリストは悲観的でリベラリストは楽観的と言ってもいいでしょうか。じゃ、実際にアメリカの政治はどうだ？ネオコンはどっちだ？とか言い始めると話が元に戻らないので、基本の概念はこの辺で。

本題。では具体的に中国が脅威であるとされる理由は
１）中華思想
２）中国国内での愛国心の高まり
３）経済
４）軍増強
５）現実
６）地政学的観点
の６つ。（←私が思いつく限り。）

１）中華思想
中国の歴史を学んだ人間ならば常識でしょうが、中国の中華思想は２０００年以上もかけて染み付いた国民性です。簡単に言うと「自分が一番だもんね」という感じなんですが、「一度でも中国の文化を受け入れたら、中華帝国の一員」→「中国が支配してもいい土地」→「中国の領土」と理論が発展しちゃっているのが近隣諸国として問題な所。日本本土は一応大丈夫でしょうが、沖縄辺りは既にグレーゾーンと化しているようです。そしてこれが台湾問題のミソでもあります。「台湾は同じ漢民族が移り住んだじゃん（内戦後）。同じ文化じゃん！」→「同じ文化なのに違う国ってあり得ない！」という意識があるんでしょうね。

２）愛国心の高まり
で、この中華帝国が約１００年にわたって屈辱を受けた時代があります。それがイギリスのアヘン戦争から日本の侵略〜終戦まで。次の項でも書きますが、経済成長によって豊かになった中国は大国としての自覚を取り戻してきたんですね。そうなると、許せないのが屈辱的な歴史の原因となった日本（とイギリス）。その頃（1970〜80）日本自体も経済的大国になっていましたし、近場だし、許せん！しかも、また侵略してくるかも知れない！と日本を仮想敵国とすることで、国民の愛国心＆反日を高め、それを政府支持へと持っていきたいのが共産党の狙い。

３）経済
んで、経済発展というのは中国を豊かにはしたのですが、同時に共産党にとって「共産主義経済の失敗」という大問題を提示している訳です。「みんな平等だよ」がモットーだったのに格差は開くばかりじゃ、共産党を支持する理由も無い。そこで、政府が編み出したのが愛国心を盛り上げ、経済を発展させ、イデオロギーには目がいかないように国民を満足させるという方法です。

４）軍増強
という訳で、手っ取り早く愛国心を盛り上げるために「失われた領土」を取り戻せ！という方針を政府は打ち出すんですね。南シナ海の島とかいい例です。しかも、意外と天然資源が豊富な東＆南シナ海、押さえておいて経済的に損はありません。しかも、石油などのエネルギーが地元で取れるという事は、アメリカ海軍やインド海軍、挙げ句にイラク戦争以降は日本の海自まで出しゃばっている始末ですから、そんなヘンチクリンなやつらがウヨウヨいるアラビア海やインド洋、そして最も海上テロの危険が大きいマラッカ海峡を通っているシーレーン（海上交易ルート）にあんまり頼らなくていいという事です。

具体的にどうするかと言えば調査とか一応やった後に、実効支配です。中国は一応、海上の国境に関する国際法を批准しているくせに、国際社会の場で国境を決めるのは嫌らしく、大抵２国間での会談によって決着をつけようとしています。軍事力経済力を盾にしている訳ですね。（因みに同じテを某国が某島に対してもやっていますが、これは先生を見習ったという事でしょうか？あんまり真似していると、同一文化の領土だと勘違いされるかもよ？）そして、軍事力アップはシーレーンそのものの防衛にも有効です。ま、こりゃそのままですね。

５）現実
これは単純。実際問題、日本の領海を侵犯してみたり、日本が「資源調査をしようかな」といえば「軍艦出すぞ」と脅してみたり、あれもこれもみんな中国脅威論のいい例です。

６）地政学的観点
中国は元々ランドパワーと呼ばれる「陸軍が強い国」なんですね。これは領土の広さをみても歴史をみてもほぼ自明と言っていいと思います。が、最近は「シーパワーにもなります」と宣言しておりまして、まずは沖縄〜台湾〜フィリピン、次に日本〜マリアナ諸島、と勢力を伸ばす気満々なのは解放軍報にもバッチリ載っているほど明らかなんです。狙いはどう考えても太平洋とインド洋。後者はビルマやパキスタンとの同盟やそれによる海軍基地の建設を考えれば明らかですし、太平洋の方もアメリカ軍に対して「半分に分けない？」と持ちかけ速攻断られたりしています。

万が一、中国海軍が太平洋、インド洋まで手を伸ばしたら、日本のシーレーンが非常に危険な訳です。日本、中国、そして台湾などアジアの国々は基本的に同じシーレーンを使っておりまして、それ故にどの国もシーレーンの安全は国益といってもいいほど気を使っている訳です。今までの内容を振り返ってみると、中国というのは非常に現実主義的に動いておりまして、シーレーンの防衛も元々は「他の国にそんな大事なルートを支配されてたまるか！」という精神な訳ですよ。そしてこれは日本にとっても同じ。現実主義的視点からすれば「中国がシーレーンを分断出来る能力を持とうとしているわ。危険！」という感じ。日本がもしこの考え方にそって行動するのならば、おそらく海上における支配権争いがアメリカなども巻き込みながら起こるでしょう。

じゃ、逆に中国非脅威論について。
１）経済依存
２）大国としての責任
３）民主化の可能性
４）実はそんなに強くない中国？

１）経済依存
経済発展による経済依存が高まれば、日本に対する敵対的行動は中国にもマイナスになるだろうというのが基本的な考え方。私個人も基本的に「経済依存アップ＝戦争のリスク小」だと思いますが、あくまで戦争の話です。東シナ海の小島なんてくれてやらぁと思っていたら沖縄が取られてたとか、あんまり笑えない冗談なので、念には念を入れておいた方がいいと思いますよ。（←だから私はリアリスト派なのです。）

２）大国としての責任
「大国として国際政治上での責任が増せば、あんまり身勝手な事はするまい。」と人は言いますが、そう言う人に限って「アメリカは帝国的振る舞いをしている。許すな！」と叫んでおります。中国の場合はスーダンあたりがいい例です。

３）民主化の可能性
民主化した中国は平和を愛する友好的な国になるに違いないという考え方。実は言うとアメリカ政府もこの辺にかけているようなのですが、民主化したとしても多分本質的には何も変わらないでしょう。というのも、中国の軍事力の増加（特に海軍）は「経済成長」や「愛国心」によって支えられているものであり、決して共産主義的な理由からではないからです。尚かつ、中華思想が政治体制の民主化ぐらいで消えるとも思えませんし、民主化後出来立ての政府が国民の支持を取り付ける為に、更なる「経済成長」「愛国心」を求めて邁進する可能性もあります。非常にいい例がロシア。中国と同じくランドパワーの強国としてユーラシアに位置し、中国と同じく帝政後ほぼ直ぐに共産党政府に移行し、そしてソ連崩壊後のロシアは１０年ほどの空白があったとはいえ、今では大国としての地位を取り戻すべくプーチン大統領の下、強権政治を行っています。中国が同じようにならんという保証がどこにも無い。確かに中国は共産党の元で経済成長を成し遂げたという違いがありますが、それがいかほどの違いを生み出すのかは非常に曖昧です。

４）実はそんなに強くない中国？
本当の所を言えば、台湾を侵攻することもできない、日本侵攻なんて夢のまた夢と言われていますが、なにせ量と成長スピードが桁違いなので安心しきって傍観する訳にもいかないでしょう。幸いと言っては何ですが、日本国内全体として、1991年以降、かなり保守的になってきているのでより多くの国民が海上の問題（特にシーレーン）について考え、その安全保障を支持するようになれば、暫くは大丈夫でしょう。

取り敢えず、こんな感じです。もう少し深く突っ込むのならば中国の国内情勢や北朝鮮、アメリカ、台湾情勢も考慮に入れる必要がありますが・・・今日はここまでにしておきます。基本的な内容は卒論がベースです。参考資料は上のbookstoreの「地政学・国際関係」や「洋書」にあるものが殆ど。

関連:中国はなぜ脅威だと思われているのか
こちらでの議論はもう少し、地政学的、理論的になっております。卒論の手直しの際の参考にしよう・・・日本の核保有もそうですが、海軍力（海上自衛隊）の増強もやり過ぎには注意が必要ですよね。戦前の歴史に学ぶものは多いと思う。

こちらは水曜日に雪になるらしい。スキーウェアのジャケットを着てもまだ寒い。

”中国化”が進む白頭山　朝鮮族自治州に危機感
数年前の高句麗問題を思い出させる記事でありますが、「中国も戦前のドイツよろしく、『生存圏』という概念を（ほぼ）明確に打ち出している」という事実を知っている身としては、「あ、やっぱり？」としか感想を持ちようがありません。因みにサミュエル・ハンチントンやらズビグニュー・ブレジンスキーやらの著書にも、この中国の「国境の見方」について触れていますので、決してマイナーなモノの見方じゃありませんよ。意地の悪い言い方をすれば「高句麗だけの問題じゃないだろ・・・どう考えても」となるでしょうか。日本はどうなんだろう？沖縄（琉球）は黒に近いグレーゾーンですが、本土の方となるとねぇ・・・明治以降は完全にセーフだと思うけどな。（←ま、日清戦争に勝ってんだし、当たり前か。）

どちらにしろ歴史の話で済めば、高みの見物もできますが、

将来の韓国（朝鮮）との国境紛争、領土紛争まで見据えた中国政府の政治的思惑があるといわれている。

とまで事態が発展すると、あんまり日本としても気分のいいものではありませんから、まぁ、なんていうのか、頑張れ。ってか、これって既に中国は北朝鮮を見放しているという前提がありません？一応核兵器も持っているのにね。

おまけ 東北工程