WUNDERKAMMER

Chapter5: Impact on India

The PLAN’s expansion also influences India, which shares only land border, but not the oceanic one.  Historically, the confrontation between them happened along their land border.  But their naval rivalry also has increased as the PLAN expands to the Indian Ocean.  Because the Indian Ocean is ”away” for the PLAN, the confrontation involves some other countries.

At first, the relation between China and India is different from the relation between China and Taiwan or Japan, because India is a member of the nuclear club.  Therefore, China concerns most the Indian nuclear capability and cannot ignore the their reaction. ^[1]Cole, 171.  Also, John W. Garver, “China’s Influence in Central and South Asia: Is It Increasing?,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University … Continue reading  Moreover, since they do not share the oceanic border, the naval confrontation is not so obvious yet.  It is easy to understand that the PLAN, which has difficulty to seize the control even in the First Islands Chain, cannot have a full influence in the Indian Ocean.  The PLAN, however, enhances its capability in this area steadily.  Today’s situation can be said that both sides are cautious with each other, avoiding direct rivalry.

At the same time the PLAN develops its capability, India has also modernized its military capability to deal with China and Pakistan. ^[2]Swaine, 278.  The Indian Navy determines that security of the Indian Ocean is the most important from both national security and economic reason. ^[3]Lal, 42.  In addition to this kind of common motivation, India also deprives the need of a strong Navy from its history; New Delhi thinks that their lack of sea power caused the colonization of India. ^[4]Vijay Sakhuja, “Indian Navy: Keeping Pace with Emerging Challenges,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. Lawrence W. … Continue reading  To protect their homeland and national interests, India has developed the Navy.  Compared with the PLAN, however, the Indian Navy is more reactive.  India prefers to use its power to keep the status quo. ^[5]Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 154.  Therefore, its development is counteracting as the PLAN expands.  Contrary to the Chinese perspective that India is not a threat, India sees China as an aggressive, undemocratic power. ^[6]Sutter, “China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils,” 240.  Of course, we cannot ignore the fact that there is some patriotism as a great power in India.  Today, the Indian Navy is the largest in the Indian Ocean and they believe that there is their own sphere of influence. ^[7]Sakhuja, 95 and 112.  Also, Donald L. Berlin, “India in the Indian ocean,” Naval War College Review 59, no.2 (2006): 60, … Continue reading  From Chinese point of view, this situation that the Indian Navy has strong influence over the Indian Ocean, where more than a half of Chinese sea-lane passes, is uncomfortable, even though the Chinese do not think India will be the possible rival. ^[8]Sutter, “China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils,” 240.  To change this situation, the PLAN chose to have allies, so that it can have influence over this area.  China’s two allies are Pakistan and Burma.

The Chinese government keeps strong ties with these states, and these ties make possible for the PLAN to have operation in the Indian Ocean with protected ports. ^[9]Garver, 217. Shift power.  First, the tie between China and Burma is very strong.  While major states imposed sanctions on Burma for its repression against prodemocracy movements, China has offered the protection in the international community, military support, and economic support. ^[10]Garver, 218-219.  Power shift.  These generous supports produce the strong willingness to follow the Chinese way in the Burmese government.  In return, China enhances the influence in the Bay of Bengal, and it will allow the PLAN to launch into the Indian Ocean. ^[11]Garver, 219-220.  Also, Cohen, 253-254.  According to Hasegawa, the PLAN built a base in the Great Coco Islands.  India became more cautious toward China, and as a reaction to this, the Indian … Continue reading

Pakistan also provides safe ports for the PLAN.  The link between China and Pakistan has long history (over 40 years). ^[12]Garver, 213.  The relation is also based on Chinese military supports. ^[13]Cohen, 209, 259-260.  As China gets naval ports in Burma by providing supports, the PLAN has the safe ports in Pakistan.  For example, the PLAN is constructing a new naval base at Gwadar. ^[14]Bill Gertz, “China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes,” The Washington Times, January 18, 2005, http://www.gwadarcorner.com.  Also, Prabhakar, 51-52.  With this base, the PLAN will enhance its influence in the eastern Indian Ocean, which is close to the Persian Gulf.

If the PLAN keeps enhancing its power in both Burma and Pakistan territory, the Indian Navy would be sandwiched by the Chinese power, and the Indian sea-lane would be under the PLAN’s control.  India needs to develop its navy to confront this challenge.  However, there are other actors who also have some influence in this area.  Japan is one of them, sending its vessels to support the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Moreover, the U.S., which is the most powerful actor in the whole Asian Seas, cannot be ignored.

大物（厚さ5センチ級）本をたくさん買ったため、寝る前本のドミニク・モイジ「感情の地政学」を読み終わるべく、本日午後いっぱい黙々と読書に励みました。なんせ寝る前本だったので、細切れで読んでいたし、その分記憶への定着と理解度が良くないことは重々承知ですが、 ^[1]ついでに、細切れで読んだという理由だけではなく、私の基礎知識と教養がないことも原因であることを認めようなんか気持ちよいほど好きになれない本でした。「この本良くないよねっ」という意見を求めてググったら、あら不思議、皆さん意外と好評価なんですね・・・私の理解度が足りないのか？と落ち込みましたが、私と同じ考えの人も０ではなかったらしいのでちょっとだけ紹介。「『感情』の地政学」読了　ひびのたわごと　より。

「感情」で世界を色分けするというのは非常に面白い着眼点だと思うのだが、
それを実際に論理的に説明することは非常に難しく、やはり印象論に終始してしまっている印象をうける。
また、内容も地政学というよりは比較文明論に近い。
著者が批判しているハンチントンの「文明の衝突」とさしてかわりがないようにも思えてしまう。
あまり難しいことを考えず「こういう世界の見方もあるよね」と、
エッセイ的なスタンスで読むのが いいのかも知れない。

そう、この「感情の地政学」はアンチ・ハンチントンとして書かれているようで、というか「敵意丸出しで書いてんなー」と私は読みながら思ったほどだったんですが、意識し過ぎて逆に同じ穴に嵌っているんですよね。モイジ氏が感情とそのマッピングとして

希望：中国とインド　でもインドと中国はまるきり同じではないし、日本は含まない

恐れ：西洋　でもアメリカとヨーロッパはまるきり同じではない

屈辱：イスラム圏　アラブ人とイスラム教については完全一致ではない ^[2]これについてもっと詳しく説明されるかと思ったら、そうでもなかったので、その辺もこの本に対して良くない印象を持つのです。

特殊な事例：ロシア圏、アフリカ、ラテンアメリカ、イランとイスラエル

に分けて説明しているんですが、イランとイスラエルという個別国家を除くと、ほぼまんまハンチントンの文明の分け方「中華文明（中国）」「ヒンドゥー文明（インド）」「イスラム文明」「日本文明」「東方正教会文明（ロシア）」「西洋文明」「ラテンアメリカ文明」「アフリカ文明」と一致するんですよね。これじゃあ、「なんだ、同じ分け方じゃん」と思った私は間違ってないと思う。感情も文明も変な言い方ですが、出所は一緒だと思うし。

また、この「感情で世界をみる」という方法が果たして「地政学」的なのかも個人的には疑問です。てっきり日本語訳本を出す時に出版社が「地政学」ってタイトルにいれたんだと思ったら、英語訳本からしてgeopoliticsってタイトルに入っていて、なんていうか非常に萎えました。民族（ヨーロッパへのイスラム教移民など）の話であって、決して「地」政学じゃないんですよね。勿論、ロシアの感情を形作っている一因として「国境（ロシア圏の範囲）」が何処までなのか？と言う問題も一因とされていたりするので、全てが全て地理と無関係な訳ではないですが。でもやっぱり地政学というよりは比較政治論、比較文化論に近いと思います。

そして、私がこの本を嫌う一番の理由は何となく漂って来る上から目線な感じ。アジアの希望、イスラムの屈辱と進んで、ヨーロッパとアメリカの恐れの章になっていきなり、「私はヨーロッパの、フランス人だからあんまり客観的になれないかも知れない」とか言い出し、続いてアメリカの説明に移る時には

アメリカの恐れの文化を説明するにあたって、わたしはある困難を痛感している。一体自分にアメリカを語る資格があるのだろうか？（P182）

といきなり意味不明な懺悔。アメリカを語る資格がないなら、アジアについてもイスラムについても、それこそ西洋以外の社会と文化として、語る資格は微塵もないと思うんだが、その辺は思いっきりスルーされているんですよね。アジアやイスラムについては全く機械的に「中国はこういう社会だから、こういう感情がある」とか「イスラム文化は女性差別がよろしくない」とか批判や結論付けているのに、同じ西洋圏のアメリカに対して「語る資格があるのだろうか？」というのはいかがなものか。

しかも、アメリカに気を使っているのかと思いきや、章の最後では

西洋に必要なのは、バランス感覚を磨くことだ。アメリカはもっと節度を、ヨーロッパはもっと意欲を持たねばならない。（中略）より大きな責任は強い方のパートナーである、アメリカの肩にかかっている。西洋が希望の文化を取り戻すのは、希望と夢の過去を持つアメリカと、二一世紀の世界とを結ぶ架け橋となる指導者を、アメリカが得たときだ。（P204）

と、完全に責任をアメリカに丸投げ。「あぁ、だからアメリカに気を使ったのね」とか「なんかこの本を読んだアメリカ人が責任を任されて喜んじゃいそうね」とか邪推した私の心が曇っているのでしょうか？

私は「ひとはその人が生まれてからの経験が完全に同一ということはあり得ないのだから 、同じ思考を持つことはないし、それ故に相手の考えることなど完全には判らない。 ^[3] … Continue reading」という哲学の持ち主なので、この本はそもそも私の哲学とぶつかる主張だったのかもしれません。勿論、相手の考えることが判らないからといって、それを理解しようと放棄することを薦める訳ではないですが、この本の中に書いてあったイスラム教（というかアラブ文化）における女性の扱い問題についてのモイジ氏の主張内容なんかを読むと、人間なかなか自分に親しみのある思考回路から抜け出せないものだな、と思います。

Chapter4: Impact on Japan

Japan once dominated  whole area of the East and South China Seas and the west Pacific Ocean.  If people think the economical growth is the reason of the PLAN’s expansion, it is natural that Japan has modern and strong maritime forces with its strong economic power.  Historically, Japan has been a strong sea power.  With little natural resources, maritime trade, fishery and shipbuilding industry has contributed to have the strong naval force. ^[1]Cole, 150.  Today, the JMSDF inherits the legacy of the Japanese Imperial Navy, even though its size and mission has changed significantly. ^[2]It is well-known story in Japan that the JMSDF is officially proud of the history of the Japanese Imperial Navy.  For example, the JMSDF uses the same flag and songs with its former Navy.  Also, … Continue reading  Under the Article 9, the JMSDF determines its missions as “effective response to the new threats and diverse situations,” “proactive efforts to improve the international security environment,” and “preparation for full-scale invasion.”  ^[3]Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, “Mission of JMSDF,” JMSDF, http://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/english/index02.html. The first two missions indicate that the JMSDF is a force for the international security, but the Japanese worry about activities of their neighbor states more than terrorism, as the last mission suggests.

First of all, the Japanese leaders’ viewpoints over the Asian security issues are quite cynical.  They assume that the situation is less stable than in the Cold War era with many considerations. ^[4]The Korean Peninsula (including the North Korea’s nuclear issues and the unclear unification process), the Taiwan Straits, and the sea-lane are main concern for Japan (Robert G. Sutter, China’s … Continue reading  Moreover, the Japanese society became more conservative after the Gulf War, and the support for the Self Defense Forces (SDF) is increasing steadily.  When the Gulf War broke out, the Japanese government decided to send money but not the personnel.  While it was the best Japan could do at that time, since there was no law that allows the SDF to go oversea for any kind of activity, it caused the accusation from the international society.  In response to this, the government enacted the PKO (peace keeping operation) cooperation law on June 19, 1992.  This law allows sending the SDF troops to oversea for humanitarian purposes under the United Nation.  From this point, the SDF has expanded its activities.  In addition to the PKO missions, North Korea has also generated the public trend to more conservative direction.  The 1998 missile tests shocked the Japanese society because it crossed over the Japanese islands.  Furthermore, two suspicious ships entered into the Japanese territory secretly and shot against the JMSDF and the Coast Guard in 1999.  These two incidents and other disasters such as the great earthquake and the terrorism targeting the Tokyo metro subway system by the Aum Sinrikyo in 1997 make people think that the SDF is the force to save people.  In addition to North Korea, the PLAN’s aggressive behaviors have also provoked the caution in Japan.  Even though the PLAN does not have the capability to invade Japan, many Japanese have seen the PLAN’s activities with suspicion. ^[5]Michael D. Swaine, “China’s Regional Military Posture,” in Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 274.  China’s … Continue reading  This trend became the rigid basis of expansion of the SDF missions after 9.11.  First, Prime Minister at that time, Junichiro Koizumi, organized more laws which make the SDF complete missions more smoothly and provide more opportunity abroad.  By the law enacted in 2003, the SDF was sent to Iraq.  Of course, this is not only for the U.S. and the war against terrorism, but it is more to advance Japanese national interests. ^[6]Japan does not see this as a chance to fill the regional power vacuums or to counter China directly (Mike M. Mochizuki, “China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium,” in Power … Continue reading  The Japanese people have never suffered from the Islam terrorists, and religion is not so important for many Japanese as for followers of Islam or Christianity.  On the other hand, oil is important for the economy, but many think to stabilize the Middle East for oil is not their responsibility. ^[7]Perhaps, they do not care whether the United States controls over the area or Islam-Arab states do, as long as the price of oil is acceptable.  As a result of assisting the U.S. forces, however, the JMSDF has expanded its activity area to the Indian Ocean.  This is quite an uncomfortable situation for the PLAN, while Japan also feels uncomfortable with the PLAN’s expansion.  This is simply because they share the same sea-lane.  Therefore, the Japanese leaders assert the PLAN’s expansion same as the Taiwan government; it is a potential threat for its sea-lane, and they are afraid of possibility of blockade by the PLAN.  The Japanese economy depends on trade significantly, and the PLAN’s sphere of activities occupies quite a large portion from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. ^[8]Eric Grove, “Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 26. W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar, “Maritime Strategic Trends in the Asia-Pacific: Issues and Challenges,” 43. And Hideaki Kaneda, “Japan’s … Continue reading  Moreover, the PLAN has shown its intention to find the route to the Pacific Ocean through the Japanese islands by sending submarines and intelligence ships around Japan. ^[9]Kaneda, 125.  According to Kane, the PLAN vessels violated Japan’s EEZ 17 times in the first half of 2000 (Kane, 116).  This is enough to evoke fear in the Japanese people.  At last, the PLAN’s strategy of the Second Islands Chain is not acceptable for Japan, because it means that all Japanese EEZ would be under the PLAN’s control.

The possibility of blockade is what Beijing fears, too.  Moreover, for the Communist government, which gained public support through fighting against Japan during 1930-40s, the stronger Japanese military power can be the chance to enhance its legitimacy and military activities. ^[10]Hasegawa, 323.  Also, Thomas J. Christensen, “China; the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000), … Continue reading  As the JMSDF becomes more powerful concerning the PLAN’s expansion, the PLAN seeks more power to compete with the JMSDF.  In addition, there are competitions over the natural resources in the East China Sea.  As the United Nations reported that there is possibility of tremendous natural resources under the water in 1968, the Chinese government suddenly started to claim its sovereignty over the area. ^[11]Hasegawa, 316.  Such territorial disputes between China and Japan still exist.  In this situation, both naval powers see each other as their potential rival.

Japan is the powerful sea power, who dominated Asia once, and this fact is enough for the PLAN to assume that Japan is the most serious threat in the Asian states.  Still, the JMSDF is the most modern and powerful force in Asia except for the US Navy, and the PLAN needs more than 20 years to match it. ^[12]Cole, 149.  Especially in the field of anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, and electronic warfare (Calder, 26).  Whether the JMSDF can benefit from this advantage or not would depend on the public support of the Japanese people for the security in Asia.  If the PLAN is perceived as serious threat for the Japanese security and economy, the JMSDF would expand its missions significantly over the Asian seas.

Chapter3: Impact on Taiwan

Taiwan receives the biggest and most direct influence by the expansion of the PLAN.  This is not only because the Communist government regards Taiwan as a part of their sovereignty, and it does not allow the independence of Taiwan, but because Taiwan is located at the geopolitically important point for China’s expansion to the outer oceans.  Basically, the PLAN has two routes to access to the Pacific Ocean: the Okinawa Islands and Taiwan. ^[1]Hasegawa, 294.  However, it is almost impossible to seize the control over the Okinawa Islands because they are legally the Japanese territory and there are substantial bases of the U.S. forces.  On the other hand, Taiwan is located only 150 kilometers away from the Chinese coast occupied by the same Chinese.  From the Chinese perspective, they have right to control the island, because Taiwan is under the Chinese culture.  In addition, Taiwan’s control on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is also attractive for the PLAN, because they are located at the middle of the sea-lane in the South China Sea. ^[2]Hasegawa, 294.  Also, US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 22.　In other words, control over the Taiwan sovereignty does not mean only to get access to the Pacific Ocean, but it will be the big step to win the territorial conflicts in the South China Sea.  Seizing Taiwan has also strong political message to other separation movements in China such as Tibet. ^[3]Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no.5 (1996): http://proxy.mbc.edu:2108/pqdweb?RQT=306&TS=1192760580&clientId=52920.  Because the Taiwan issue is the most visible to the international society, the Communist government might be able to eliminate resistance in the other areas after they achieve control of Taiwan.  If even Taiwan could not keep independent, how can small minority groups achieve it?  In this way, seizing Taiwan can be the first big step to achieve the PLAN’s strategic goal and the national interest.

As the practical means, there are three tactics the PLAN can take against Taiwan: amphibious assault, blockade, and missile strike. ^[4]Cole, 155.  The first one must be the last option for the PLAN, because it needs many vessels and people, which is more than the PLAN’s capability, and there are few landing points in both sides of Taiwan coasts. ^[5]Howarth, 48.  Also, Cole, 155.  According to Cole, the Taiwan Strait itself is the burden for the invasion.  The PLAN has to calculate its high winds and seas with many typhoons (Cole, 155).  In … Continue reading  In this case, Taiwan forces can anticipate the possible routes the PLAN will take and can counterfight easily.  Geographically, in short, Taiwan Island is hard to invade.  In addition, there is no sign that the PLAN is building any type of fleet (merchant and naval vessels) to achieve the invasion. ^[6]Howarth, 49.  This means that the PLAN will not have ability to invade in the near future.  Of course, the PLAN cannot ignore the Taiwan Navy.  Because the PLAN has not accomplished to seize the sea control over the Straits yet, the Taiwan Navy might win at the battle, or at least the Taiwan Navy survive to bother the invasion. ^[7]Cole, 155.  In any case, the amphibious assault costs too much for both sides of the straits, and it is not a possible choice that Beijing will choose in close future. ^[8]Howarth, 49.  Therefore, the PLAN has two options left: blockade and missile strikes.  The latter option sounds easier, but they are not accurate yet. ^[9]Cole, 157.  Moreover, no one knows how much the Taiwan people can resist against them. ^[10]Cole, 157.  In short, missile strikes are great gamble for China in many ways.

In this way, blockade is the most possible in the three choices.  Even though blockade is not perfect, the fear to be blockaded is enough to evoke concern about the sea power for both the people and the government. ^[11]Measheimer, 127-132.  For example, Mearsheimer himself think the blockade does not work without corresponding land power.  He explained this point with the example of the Japanese defeat at the end … Continue reading  Taiwan does not have any energy resources except for the nuclear power, and its economy is dependent on the trade. ^[12]Michael C. Grubb, “Merchant Shipping in a Chinese Blockade of Taiwan,” Naval War College Review 60, no.1 (2007): 88, … Continue reading  Also, blockade against Taiwanese ports is very easy.  As mentioned above, Taiwan has natural limits to build a port; therefore, there are only two important commercial ports in the west coast (Chinese side).  Therefore, the PLAN can use the tactics to blockade ports besides the blockade of the sea-lanes. ^[13]Cole, 156.  This tactics is same with the military reason.  As Okumura described with examples of Spanish-American War (blockade of Santiago by Mahan) and Russo-Japanese War (blockade of Lushun by … Continue reading  In addition, Taiwan is in the Chinese territory, so that the PLAN could mine and blockade without violation of the international law. ^[14]Cole, 156.    Therefore, blockade needs fewer vessels, costs and efforts to defeat Taiwan than the other two choices, and this blockade theory fits Sun Zi’s “subduing the enemy without any battle,” which is the Chinese basic military strategy throughout its history. ^[15]Howarth, 140.  Also, the Taiwan Navy and the U.S. Navy in Asia have small capability of anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare (Howarth, 51 and Cole, 157).  This fact makes the blockade more possible … Continue reading

As the PLAN increases its size and expands its area of activity, Taiwan is more threatened.  The PLAN wants this island for several reasons; it is a national goal to annex the island under the Communist’s government; it is strategically important to take control over the island to get access to the Pacific Ocean; and it will be a strong message to other separatists in China.  However, taking control over the island is not so easy yet.  Right now, the PLAN has only ability to blockade Taiwan, and it is still not sure whether this could work as the PLAN initially intends, because Taiwan can stockpile the energy resources, and because there is possibility of air supplies, as the U.S. did for Western Germany during the Cold War. ^[16]Cole, 157-158.  Moreover, the PLAN cannot ignore the US power in the East China Sea.  If China launches un-peaceful seizure of Taiwan, the U.S. (and possibly the international society) must react. ^[17]Howarth, 55.  Also, US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 33.  But before the discussion how the US dominance actually influences on this issue, let’s focus on two other major naval powers in the Asia: Japan and India.

Chapter2: History of the PLAN and Its Missions

To discuss how the PLAN has developed is important in this research.  Without comparing with its past, it is hard to understand how rapidly the PLAN is developing in recent years, and how much its strategy has changed.  Briefly, the PLAN experienced two very different periods: Mao Zedong’s period, and post-Mao’s period.

1)    Mao’s Period

As Bernard D. Cole declared, “the Communist victory in 1949 was an Army victory.” ^[1]Cole,16.  Moreover, most wars that the Communist government had experienced during the Mao’s period were land wars (Cole, 8).  The Communist party had only an army through the civil war.  Even though the Japanese came from the ocean during 1930s-first 1940s, the main battlefield was the Chinese land, so that the Chinese did not have any sufficient naval power. ^[2]If China had had the strong naval power, it might be able to suffer the Japanese military forces, by blockading the supply line from Japan to the continent.  However, China could not afford it with … Continue reading  After the civil war, the Communist party established the first navy (the East China People’s Navy) to compete with the Kuomintang (Nationalist) Navy in Taiwan, and soon it modified into People’s Liberation Army’s Navy in 1950 with the assistance of the Soviet Union. ^[3]Cole, 17.  As symbolizing the Navy’s position under the Army, the first commander of the PLAN was Xiao Jingguang, who was a revolutionary officer with no experience in navy. ^[4]Cole, 17.  At that time, the Kuomintang Navy was superior to the PLAN, so PLAN’s main mission was only to defend the coastal line with the pragmatic strategy. ^[5]Cole, 16.  Simultaneously, however, the Communist government’s final goal was to seize Taiwan. ^[6]Cole, 18.  It is, from the Chinese viewpoint, a province, not a state.  In Taiwan, there are people who share the Chinese culture, so that they should be under the same central government (in this case, under the Communist Party).  Mao claimed that a strong navy was needed to defeat the imperialists, but there were many problems to accomplish its goal. ^[7]Cole, 162-163.  It does not mean that Mao wanted the blue ocean fleets.  The Korean War did not change the leaders’ viewpoint that the coastal defense was enough to counter against the American … Continue reading  First of all, the Navy did not have modern ships and trained personnel. ^[8]Cole, 19.  Most ships were collected from the Navy of Republic of China and the commercial vessels with various mechanisms from various countries. ^[9]Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.4,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_kenkan_c_4.html.  Moreover, the plan to purchase vessels from foreign countries was failed as the Korean War broke out. ^[10]Cole, 17.  Most personnel are from the PLA, and had never been trained as naval men.  This situation was also caused by the lack of naval experience for almost a hundred years.

In addition, Mao’s preferences strongly influenced the PLAN. ^[11]Cole, 20.  Also, Thomas M. Kane, Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 62.  Because the Maoists had emphasized more on the soldier’s ideological spirit than the modernization of military, the PLAN could not develop its size and weaponry. ^[12]Cole, 23.  As mentioned above, the Navy needed both trained personnel and modern vessels; with Maoism, the PLAN could get neither.  Moreover, becoming the nuclear power influenced the naval modernization. ^[13]Cole, 23.  If a state has the nuclear weapons, it gets the deterrence against foreign states.  In other words, no state wants to risk being target of a nuclear weapon; therefore it could be the perfect deterrent.  Even though submarines could have an important role in the nuclear strategy, this new weapon did not contribute to the actual development of the Navy. ^[14]Cole, 23.  The leaders thought the strong Army and the nuclear power were enough to defend China.

At last, the Communist government itself was unstable during 1950s-1970s. ^[15]In 1953, China’s First-Five-Year Plan began.  It is the Soviet model collectivization of farms and industries.  It had changed the Chinese economic system.  Also during the early 1950s, … Continue reading  In such situation, it is hard to develop a modern navy for China.  In short, the theory of People’s War was adopted as the naval strategy in this period; the coastal defense was the major goal of the PLAN, and the lack of modernized vessels and trained personnel was caused by the Korean War and domestic instability. ^[16]Hasegawa, 298.  But these burdens had mostly eliminated after 1976 with both domestic and international changes.

2)    Post-Mao’s Period

Under an increasing threat from the Soviet’s Navy, and supported by domestic stability under Deng Xiaoping, the PLAN finally was able to take on an important role in China’s security strategy.  First, the Soviet power became the serious threat after the split of 1960. ^[17]This event caused the end of Soviet assistance.  Yoichi Hiyama, “Development of Chinese Navy Ch.6,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, … Continue reading  Under Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, whose theory was that strong navy is the basis to be the super power, the Soviet Union attempted to build a strong fleet which covered all over the world. ^[18]Cole, 164.  Also, Peter Howarth, China’s Raising Sea Power: the PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge (London: Frank Cass, 2006), 26.  With this increasing threat from the Soviet Navy, the Chinese leaders started to consider the protection of its sea-lane and natural resources under the water, as its economy grew. ^[19]Cole, 26.  In addition, after the Vietnam War, the leaders changed its strategy from guerrilla warfare to modernization. ^[20]Hasegawa, 298.  The government finally realized the importance of modern weapons, and fortunately they could afford to modernize the military at that time.  Moreover, this was the first time China concerned on the dispute territory connecting with the natural resources. ^[21]Cole, 164.  Also, Kane, 63.  In 1980s, PLAN showed its intention to seize islands in the South China Sea (Cole, 25).  The modernization of the PLAN and the expansion of its activities accreted in 1980s.

Again, how the party leaders see the PLAN and the importance of maritime affairs influences its size and strategy.  For example, because the leaders think the maritime communication is important economically, and the future war would be naval, the PLAN seems to receive quite a big amount of budget, even though the PLAN is relatively small in size compared with whole PLA. ^[22]Cole, 68, 180.  Also, You Ji, “China’s Naval Strategy and Transformation,” in The Evolving Maritime Balance of Power in the Asia-Pacific: Maritime Doctrines and Nuclear Weapons at Sea, ed. … Continue reading  Military modernization is another example of the political influence over the military affairs.  Because the Communist government is afraid the foreign interventions that is for human right issues, environmental issues and Taiwan issues, the PLA seeks the modernization of defense system. ^[23]Lal, 91-94.  It can be the proof that the Chinese government thinks the nuclear power would not deter the conventional war anymore.  Nevertheless, a fear of losing the political power forms the government’s basic strategies. ^[24]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 6.  The Communists’ ideology does not provide national unity anymore, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic reforms in China and the Tiananmen demonstrations. ^[25]Lal, 63.  Also, Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Dioayn Islands,” in The Rise of China, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: The … Continue reading  For the legitimacy of the government, the Communist Party must find new strategies to boost people’s support.  For example, even though the economic reforms that are based on the free market system pose a different direction from the communists’ ideology, the government needs to advance them to sustain its legitimacy. ^[26]Lal, 65-68.  The military strength is used in the same way.  Since nationalism prevails among the Chinese, the Communist government has to show its ability as the great state through its military strength.  In addition, Chinese self-image is also important because it is the basis how China behaves.  As mentioned in chapter1, the Chinese people think their country has been a great power over its history.  This perspective is enhanced by the rapid economic development and taking important roles in many occasions such as the recent six-party talks on Korea or in the ASEAN organization.  Therefore, the Chinese leaders naturally think that military power needs to be advanced as China gains increasing status in international society and the national interest. ^[27]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 7.  Perhaps, they also might think the guerilla warfare would not suit with the mighty China, because it is supposed to be the tactics of the weak.  China is not weak anymore.  In short, the Chinese policy on the oceans is influenced by its trade driven economic development and nationalism.

The discussion on the naval development strategy, the importance of maritime communication, and the defense of interest in oceans became intense in the1980s. ^[28]Hasegawa, 298-299.  In the 1990s, the coastal defense strategy expanded to the offshore defense strategy as the Chinese economy and the maritime communication had expanded. ^[29]US Office of Naval Intelligence, China’s Navy 2007 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 24-25.  Also, Hasegawa, 299.  The PLAN’s missions in the offshore defense are to defend against invasion from ocean, to protect its territory and maritime interest, and to unify the motherland (Taiwan). ^[30]US Office of Naval Intelligence, 25.  Also, Hasegawa, 302.  More broadly, China sets three-steps to their strategic goals.  The first goal is to have ability to win middle-size limited war by 2005; then the second is to have a space defense system by 2015; and the third is to have military power which can have an influence on international affairs as the United States by 2050.   ^[31]Hasegawa, 198.  In the National Defense of China 2006, this three-step goal is written in more ambiguous language.  For example, the first step is “to lay a solid foundation” of modernization … Continue reading  Even though the second step does not relate with the Navy, the other two steps cannot be achieved without the naval power.  The PLAN’s role in the Chinese grand strategy is significant.  In other words, the naval strategy is central to the national strategy for China today.

However, because the PLA is the military for the Party, it cannot abandon the slogan of “People’s War,” so that the theory of Communism and Socialism could be a burden on the military development and modernization, as it was during the Mao’s period. ^[32]Hasegawa, 293.  In other words, if the PLA ever abandons the slogan, the military force is not under the Party anymore, and such situation would happen only after the huge social changes.  Right now, the modernization of the military is in tension with the Army’s ideology as much as the economic system is.

The officer who had most influence on new strategy is Liu Huaqing, who was the Commander-in-Chief of PLAN from 1982 to 1988 and the vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission to 1997. ^[33]Cole, 26, 165-166.  Also, Howarth, 25-26, and Kane, 62.  Liu was originally from the PLA’s Second Field Army, which characteristics were pro-modernization and professionalism under the party commissar, Deng Xiaoping. ^[34]Howarth, 25.  He studied in Leningrad in early 1950s under Gorshkov. ^[35]Howarth, 26.  Influenced by him, Liu claimed that the oceans are getting more strategic importance; the maritime affairs are essential for the national economy, and to support the affairs, the strong navy is needed. ^[36]Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”

Liu determined two important lines for the Chinese naval strategy.  They are called the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain (Figure2).  These lines are still basic concepts today.  The First Island Chain is from Japan to the Philippines along the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan. ^[37]Cole, 166.  For the PLAN, this line could be called the strategic zone, or the lebensraum, because there is a territorially ambiguous area along the Chinese border where many states insist sovereignty over islands and borders, and this area is the life line to keep the sea-lane safe, to sustain economic development, therefore to keep society stable under the communist Party.  Today, China still does not control the whole of it, because of the presence of Japan, Taiwan and the U.S. ^[38]Howarth, 86.  To control this line is the most important mission for the PLAN to accomplish the national security goal. ^[39]The PLA’s mission is to provide ìthe guarantee for maintaining China’s security and unity, and realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way (People’s … Continue reading

The second Island Chain is from Japan to Australia through the Marianas. ^[40]Cole, 166.  Since China does not control the First Island Chain yet, Beijing plans it might be about 2020 to seize the control of this area. ^[41]Cole, 166.  Of course, it will be hard to achieve for the PLAN.  The PLAN’s intention to expand its power over this area means that the United States would withdraw from Asia, and Japan would just see the American withdrawal without any action. ^[42]Howarth, 42.  Also, Cole, 167.  In today’s situation, this is unlikely to happen.  China has too many obstacles: the U.S. and Japan.  Moreover, China would also have to seize Taiwan first to control the first Islands Chain.  In any case, it is sure that China is trying to control the two lines.

With these concepts, the structure of the PLAN seems to be based on the First Islands Chain.  The PLAN has five branches (submarines, surface forces, naval aviation, coastal defense, and marine crops) in three fleets-North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. ^[43]Cole, 82-23.  The North Sea Fleet covers northern half of Yellow Sea, the East Sea Fleet’s area of responsibility is the southern half of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait, and the South Sea Fleet covers the South China Sea to Vietnam. ^[44]US Office of Naval Intelligence,1.  Also Cole, 82-23.  See Figure3.  Each fleet has important roles.  For example, the North Sea Fleet is nearest to Russia, South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. Navy based in Japan.  Taiwan is in the area where the East Sea Fleet has responsibility.  At last, the South Sea Fleet covers the dispute islands in the South China Sea such as Spratly Islands.  Tactically, the PLAN might take sea blockade, anti-sea-lanes campaign against the enemy, landing on the enemy’s territory campaign, antiship campaign, Chinese sea-lane defense, and naval base defense with these three fleets. ^[45]US Office of Naval Intelligence, 27.

As a whole, the most important trend of PLAN’s mobilization is deployment of modern submarines. ^[46]Eight new submarines in 2005, and seven in 2006.  Many of them are from Russia (O’Rourke, 8).  Today, most Chinese submarines are old, noisy and slow, even though its number is large.  New … Continue reading  Submarines are different from other ships because of their stealth and surprise tactics. ^[47]Karl Lautenschlager, “The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901-2001,” International Security 11, no.2 (1986-1987): 94, http://proxy.mbc.edu:2054/search/AdvancedSearch.  These tactics allow submarines to harass the maritime commerce and to deploy the nuclear ballistic missiles, besides other basic missions such as coastal defense. ^[48]Lauthenschlager, 101-102.  With these reasons, deploying of submarines by China has tremendous impact on its neighbor states, because they might threat on their sea-lane and cities without being noticed.  In short, their mission is independent from the actual control of the seas. ^[49]Lauthenschlager, 109.  Also, Howarth, 69.  Even though a state has the maritime control militarily, submarines can sneak in.  To prevent it, a state has to have the modern anti-submarine sonar sufficiently.

The Chinese fleets, including both submarines and surface ships, are aimed to gain these Chinese national interests: protection of the sea-Lane and coastal defense, natural resources in ocean, and territorial sovereignty.  The rest of this chapter will focus on each of them.

a) Protection of Sea-Lane and Coastal Defense

Protection of the sea-lanes and coastal defense has become more important as the Chinese economy has grown.  Because the Chinese government gains legitimacy through this economic boom, the government wants to sustain the growth.  Today, China is one of the largest exporting and importing countries in the world. ^[50]China is ranked as the third in both exports and imports of merchandise.  World Trade Organization, “Trade Profile: China,” World Trade organization, … Continue reading  Moreover, the mass production as the world’s factory is based on the energy.  In other words, “no energy, no products.”  Therefore, Chinese strategy is influenced by the high degree of energy dependence on the foreign countries. ^[51]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, 8.

Security on import of oil is most important because oil is absolutely needed for the economy of China. ^[52]Coal is the easiest energy resource for China (actually 70% of primary energy are from coal) since China is self- sufficient in it.  However, it causes serious environmental problems such as air … Continue reading  China did not need to import oil till 1993; now, China is the second biggest importer of it following the United States. ^[53]Calder, 3.  Also, Kane, 64.  Even though China actually has huge amounts of oil (and coal), it is still not efficient because of the lack of infrastructure and the investment. ^[54]Calder, 5-6.  According to Cole, China is the fifth largest oil producer (Cole, 55).  So, importing from other states is much easier.  Moreover, because of the economic growth, the affluent Chinese consume more energy than before.  This situation that oil is dependent on the sea-lane is the major concern for many Chinese.  Of course, the sea-lane is not only for oil.  It is also for the trade of products.  Because the major imports come from the Persian Gulf, the defense of the sea-lane that passes through the Indian Ocean, the Strait of Malacca, and the South China Sea is crucial for PLAN. ^[55]Howarth, 26.  In addition, this line connects the trade with Europe, too.  Especially the Strait of Malacca is important because there might be a possible terrorist attack there aimed to destroy the economic system in the world.  At the same time, the presence of the US Navy is uncomfortable for China.  The US Navy controls over the sea-lane and if it wants, it is possible to blockade the Chinese trade line. ^[56]Calder, 10.  Since it is easy to estimate that China will need more oil for its economic growth, and that Chinese dependence on the sea-lane will increase as the amounts of trade increase, China tries to insure its security.  Being blockaded is a nightmare for the Communist government, so that it is logical strategy to make the Navy capable to secure the sea-lane and its maritime commerce.  In addition, protecting the sea-lane means protecting the coastline, because it is the one end of the sea-lane. ^[57]Cole, 169.  Since most big cities are located along the coast, protecting them against direct attack and blockade derives from the same reason of protection of the sea-lane.  Potential destruction of these centers of commerce is also a nightmare for the Chinese government.

b) Natural Resources in Ocean

The natural resources under the water are another reason why the PLAN is expanding its mission.  Such resources especially petroleum and natural gas might fulfill the shortage of energy resources. ^[58]Cole, 55.  Furthermore, because the Chinese worry about the dependence on the sea-lane which is under the US control, having energy providers in its own territory seems a good idea.  Both the East and South China Seas are said to have tremendous amounts of natural resources. ^[59]Cole, 58-59.  According to Hasegawa, it is said that there is a large amount of petroleum (25 billions tons) and natural gas (8,400 billions cubic meter) in the East China Sea (Hasegawa, 288).  If the PLAN could control these areas completely, China could get stable reserves of natural resources.  Moreover, the international instability causes anxiety in China.  Russia is a possible provider of oil, because it is close to China and there is no need to depend on the US dominated sea-lane.  But Russia is still unstable and its infrastructure is wearing out.  Imports from Central Asian states cause the same concern, as does the Middle East. ^[60]Cole, 62.  China wants to find a stable natural resources provider.  In addition to energy resources, the seas provide food.  China is the world’s biggest seafood producer today, and it is predictable that there are more needs as both economy and population grows. ^[61]Cole, 64.  The Chinese government itself is trying to preserve East and South China Seas from overfishing, but the need for seafood keeps growing. ^[62]Cole, 38.  Thus, China might need to expand its fishery area into outer oceans.  Actually, China has many fishing disputes with its neighbors.  In any case, the Chinese government finds the importance in the oceanic territory.  As the security reason, controlling more sea territory seems better to sustain the economy and population.

c) Territorial sovereignty

At last, the territorial sovereignty is one of the major missions of the PLAN.  The PLA officers have strong feelings that they are defending the Chinese territory and the national interests. ^[63]Cole, 133.  Furthermore, some Chinese claim the Chinese sovereignty over small islands and oceanic territory regardless how the international laws define them. ^[64]Cole, 30.  This feeling might grow with the Chinese nationalism: taking back the missing territory proves China’s might and economic growth.  In addition, since today’s international law determines the right of economical activities around the islands, there is more chance to expand the right over the natural resources.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China ratified in 1996, determines a contiguous zone as area where a state can control in certain cases of security, an exclusive economic zone as area where a state can exploit the economic rights, and a continental shelf as the sea-bed beyond the territorial sea with the right of exploitation of natural resources (but states have no right on the surface and airspace above the continental shelf). ^[65]Cole, 31-32.  With this law, having sovereignty over islands means that a state can gain tremendous economic benefits.  Combining the nationalism and the economic reason, the PLAN has preceded the claim sovereignty over the dispute areas and then actually occupied them. ^[66]There is the pattern that the PLAN takes to get the control over the dispute areas: claim of sovereignty, research, deployment of fleets, and then actual occupation (Hasegawa, 315).  Also, the … Continue reading  Moreover, to affirm Chinese sovereignty over disputed islands, the government passed “Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone” in 1992, which includes Taiwan, the Penghu, Dangsha, Senkaku(Diaoyu), Paracel, Spratly and other islands in the South China Sea as Chinese territory. ^[67]Cole, 34.  Most disputes with other neighbors are islands in the East and South China Seas where is important for the security of the sea-lane and the coast, and natural resources.

These are reasons why the PLAN expands its activities.  Since both East and South China Seas are not so big, such activities of the PLAN have influences on the other states in Asia which also consider the benefit and security of the seas as important.  From next chapter, how this PLAN’s strategy and activities have impact on the neighbor states will be discussed.

Chapter1: Introduction

China has had a huge army since its history began.  From the era of Sanguozhi to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the army has always been regarded as the main military force of China.  The reason why China has kept a huge army is that major threats typically have come from the northern border of China.  As the Great Wall indicates, the equestrian peoples such as the Mongolians and the Manchurians had attacked the mainland of China from the north and the Chinese had to prepare for them by maintaining an army.  Of course, this does not mean that China has not held any naval power in its history.  Actually, the Chinese people traveled to Africa during the Ming Dynasty. ^[1]Kataru hasegawa, “China’s Military Threat,” in Thinking Japanese New Security, ed. Masahiro Sakamoto and Tadamasa Fukiura (Tokyo: Jiyu-Kokuminsya, 2004), 291.  According to Hasegawa, the … Continue reading  Though people know this historical fact, their primary concern has been China as a land power state, seeing its navy as relatively weak or small, when compared with its army.

Today, the Communist government is building a modern Navy and trying to expand its active area from the South and East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. ^[2]“China Suggests Dividing the Pacific ocean?” Sankei WEB, 20 August 2007, http://www.sankei.co.jp/kokusai/usa/070820/usa07820001.htm. Also Yoichi Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, … Continue reading  The government has the plan to introduce a new aircraft carrier, and bought Russian submarines, as well as its the second generation of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. ^[3]US Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2007), 3-4.  Also, Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval … Continue reading  Why is China starting to build a modern navy now?  It is true that the progress of the Chinese navy has been behind that of the US Navy, the Japanese Marine Self Defense Force (JMSDF), and the Taiwan Navy in modernization; and that these three marine forces have tremendous influence over the East and South China Sea, which are China’s closest seas.  The US Navy, the strongest of the three, has influence in the two huge oceans surrounding East Asia: the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean.  Moreover, the power of the Indian Navy, which succeeds from the Indian Loyal Navy of the colonial era, cannot be ignored.  What is the strategy of Chinese navy in such a situation, and how does it challenge them?

Before discussing these points, the basic concepts of power, sea strategy, the importance of maritime affairs and Sinocentrism need to be reaffirmed.  First, the concept of realist theory needs to be discussed, because it might be the best way to explain China’s behavior.  The realists believe that 1) the states are the main actors in the international affairs, 2) primarily, it is the international system that affects the behaviors of states, and 3) each state behaves to gain more power.   ^[4]John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (Tokyo: Satsuki-Shobo, 2007), 37-38.  Other states are potential threats in this system, so that states cannot trust each other, and try to have more power to get better position to survive.  In short, its own power is the only thing to trust.  So, what is the state’s power?  John J. Mearsheimer defined that power of a state has “latent power” and “military power.” ^[5]Mearsheimer, 87.  According to him, “latent power” is the power to create “military power,” and “military power” is purely power of military based on the size and strength of each force, though they do not always link with each other.   ^[6]Mearsheimer, 87-88.  He used the today’s Japanese status as an example of this.  Japan has tremendously economic power and high technology, but it is not militarily powerful since it has … Continue reading  Now, these definitions need to be applied to the maritime affairs.

Straightforwardly, the power on seas is called sea power.  If we apply the definition of Mearsheimer on maritime affairs, “latent power” is the scale of maritime activities and oceanic territory, and ”military power” is directly the power of naval force.  Combining them, Yoichi Hirama defines the sea power as “the maritime power combined by political power, technological power, and military power to advance the national interests, to achieve the national goals, and the national policy.” ^[7]Yoichi Hirama, “The Value of Sea Power, Especially Naval Power,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, http://www.bea.hi-ho.ne.jp/hirama/yh_ronbun_senryaku_kaiyou.htm.

In short, “latent power” means the economic power at seas.  First, seas are important for a state because they are the major field of transportation.  Alfred Thayer Mahan described that seas are highways since there are many specific routes, and he pointed out that the maritime trade is much cheaper and easier, which is still true in the twenty first century. ^[8]Also it is important that heading any direction as people want is possible on seas.  There is no obstacle there, but people have certain roots.  This is way Mahan called them “highways.”  … Continue reading  These highways are called sea-lanes.  Sea-lanes are crucial for many states to develop their economies, because they are free while they make it possible to transport enormous amounts of resources, goods and foods. ^[9]Yoichi Hirama, “The Japanese Security Issues on the Sea Lane in the 21st Century,” Laboratory of History-Strategy-National Security, … Continue reading  Especially in this era of globalization, the importance of sea-lanes is increasing.  Second, the latent power includes the natural resources under the water, which promise an economic advantage.  As technology has advanced, people find tremendous amounts of natural resources under the sea.  Such resources include petroleum, natural gas, and other rare metals. ^[10]Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, Military Strategy.”  Moreover, it is possible to build power plants in a sea by using the power of wave and heat today. ^[11]Hirama, “The Maritime and Foreign Policy, Military Strategy.”  Therefore, having more maritime territory means that the state has more chance to develop.  Both sea-lanes and the oceanic territory are economically important.

On the contrary, “military power” at sea is used to protect latent power.  Major missions of navies during peacetime are to protect the sea-lanes and territory, while major missions at wartime are to keep the command over the seas. ^[12]Mahan.  This does not mean that the navy has to get the control all over the sea for all time during a war, but it needs to keep the control of key places, because it makes harder for the enemy to access the strategically important points or impossible to go out from ports. ^[13]Mearsheimer, 124.  Also, Corbett clearly stated, “Command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes.” Julian … Continue reading  Moreover, a key maritime strategy of navies is to control the enemy by controlling his system of trade. ^[14]J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control, (Tokyo: Fuyo-Shobo, 2007), 159.  He thinks this type of control is still useful even though it is the era of the nuclear weapons and … Continue reading  Since the latent power, which is usually the basis of military power, is dependent on the economic situation, controlling the enemy’s economy is a powerful method to control the enemy itself. ^[15]Wylie supported this point as he claimed, “The influence of trade and its sea lane is tremendous (Wylie, 149).”  Blockade is one of these tactics that a Navy can take at wartime to control the enemy.  As Mahan called it “the most shocking characteristic of sea power”, the blockade intends to cut off the trade line so that the enemy cannot sustain his economy; moreover, it sometimes causes movements in the enemy to stop the war, because the people of the enemy might support their government less with worse living environment from lack of commodities. ^[16]Mearsheimer, 126.  In any case, because many states depend on sea-lanes, any form of attack on them has tremendous influence on the enemy.

At last, the characteristics of the Chinese are also important to discuss about the Chinese Navy, as Mahan listed the national characteristics as a important factors to calculate a state’s sea power. ^[17]Mahan. 1.geographical position, 2.physical conformation, 3.extent of territory, 4.number of population, 5.national character, and 6.character of the government are six points Mahan listed as … Continue reading  China is basically the land power state which is always under the threat to be invaded.  Briefly, the characteristics of land power states are authoritarian, closed, and tendency to military power, because of the surrounding environment that has constant threats from its neighbors. ^[18]Moreover, such a state adopts the draft system and Army has the first propriety.  Yoichi Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia from Viewpoints of Geopolitics and History,” Laboratory of … Continue reading  Furthermore, the one party system under the Communist Party enhances these characteristics.

With these environment, the Chinese people have a sense of narcissism while their long history has enforced it. ^[19]Hasegawa, 289.  The simplest example of this philosophy is the name of the country as the “center of the world.” ^[20]Hasegawa, 289.  Also Zbigniew Brzeinski, The Grand Chessboard, (Tokyo: Nikkei Bussiness Jin-Bunko, 2003), 257.  Other countries around China are more barbaric and inferior to them, and so that they cannot be equal.  The trade between China and these inferior states is not equal, as only the Chinese Emperor can admit it.  Even the industrialized Britain, which obviously had more power than China, was treated in this way.  Furthermore, this idea brings China the ambiguity of its border, since all countries around it must be followers of China as they welcome to be a part of great China. ^[21]Hasegawa, 289-290.  From the viewpoint of Chinese people, if the state adapts the Chinese culture, the land should be under the control of China. ^[22]Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”  According to Hawsegawa, the Chinese history textbook includes Korea, Okinawa (Liu Chui), Taiwan, Singapore, Murray Peninsula, Vitnam, Tailand, … Continue reading  In other words, China traditionally has had the idea that “mine is mine. Yours is mine, too.”  Today, this idea of ambiguous territory is called “strategic zone” which is similar to the Nazis’ Lebensraum theory in the Chinese governmental documents. ^[23]Hasegawa, 303.  Also, Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 9.  Zbigniew Brzezinski supported that many Chinese have this idea, as he reported that there is an elevation of nationalism in China these days. ^[24]Brzezinski, 256.  The last 150 years was the period of humiliation by the defeat of the Opium War, followed by the unequal trade treaties with Britain and the military invasion by Japan.  Now, Chinese people think that they are strong enough to wipe the dark history off, and the ones who had humiliated China must be punished. ^[25]Brzezinski, 257.  Also Huntington, 168 and 229.  Furthermore, for the Chinese, peace can be accomplished under the hegemony of China. ^[26]Hasegawa, 289.  Also Hirama, “The Security Issues of Northeast Asia.”  Without taking into account these unique Chinese characteristics, it is hard to predict China’s true goal.  But because they are consistent with the realists’ power theory, China’s national character is also important to understand the theory behind the policy.

More militarily, characteristics of the political leaders have strong influence on People’s Liberation Army’s Navy’s (PLAN) development.  This is because the military forces in China are under the Communist Party.  In other words, the PLA is not military force for the citizens of China; it is for the Chinese Communist Party to promote its Socialism revolution. ^[27]Hasegawa, 292.  Also, Rollie Lal, Understanding China and India: Security Implications for the United States and the World (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006), 114.  As Mao insisted, “political power comes from the barrel of the gun,” the Chinese politics and military are combined together. ^[28]Hasegawa, 292.  In addition to the political-military tie, there is also strong economic-military tie, too (People’s Liberation Army, China, National Defense 2006 (Beijing: GPO, 2006), Section6).  Therefore, the political decisions are for the military goals, and the military strategies are for the political goals.  The Communist Party control military affairs as well as other organizations of the government, and the military have to obey its order. ^[29]Hasegawa, 292.  The Central Military Commission (CMC) has power that “deciding on the military strategy and operational guidelines of the armed forces, directing and administering the deployment … Continue reading  To prove this point, the party commissar is assigned to each individual military unit. ^[30]Hasegawa, 292.  As figure1 shows, the Central Military Commission (CMC), controls all PLA sections.  The CMC of the People’s Republic of China (the state, not the party) is composed of exactly the same members as the CMC of the Communist Party of China. ^[31]People’s Liberation Army, Section3.  In this way, the Party controls the armed forces, even though the professionalization and modernization in the PLAN have caused less loyalty to the Party. ^[32]When it was founded, the same person occupied the political and military leadership so that the relation between the politics and the military was strong.  Today, many people do not dependent on … Continue reading  In addition, the PLAN is under the PLA’s control as its name proves. ^[33]Hasegawa, 292.  This is the proof how the leaders have seen the PLAN.  The Navy is less important then the Army; this has been the basis of the Chinese military affairs.

Having explored basic concepts in Chapter1, the rest of this paper discusses the Chinese Navy as follows.  Chapter2 will present the brief history of the PLAN and the present situation of the PLAN such as its structure, its strategy, and its major activities.  Then Chapter3, Chapter4, and Chapter5 consider the impact of PLAN’s build-up on Taiwan, Japan, and India.  At last, the PLAN’s challenge to the American Naval dominance in East Asia will be discussed in Chapter6.

大分前になりましたがラムズフェルト元国防長官の自伝「真珠湾からバグダッドへ　ラムズフェルド回想録」を読みました。今回はその簡単な感想を。ただし全体に対してではなく、印象に残った部分だけですので、悪しからず。

①ラムちゃんとライスやパウエルとの確執について

子ブッシュ政権内では「ライスやパウエルはハト派、ラムちゃんはタカ派」という印象が日米マスメディアの報道の影響もあり、定説になっているけれども、視点を変えるとそうでもないのかも、という感想をもった今回の自叙伝。勿論ラムちゃんは自分が正しいと思う事を正しいとして書くし、また過去についても自叙伝なんだからラムちゃんの視点でしか語られないのは当たり前なんですが、例えばラムちゃんの語る大統領補佐官としてのライスの会議の進め方は確かにいただけない。ライスの頭の良さ、そして女性かつ黒人であると言うダブルの壁を乗り越えて、あの地位まで上り詰めた勤勉さ（毎日トレーニングしているとかそういった部分も）を敬愛する私としてはちょっとショックなくらいです。ラムちゃんによると

ライスのNSC運営の特徴は、省庁間で意見が異なる時に大統領に決定を委ねるのではなく、可能な限り自分が”ギャップを埋め”ようとすることだった。（中略）”勝者”と”敗者”がうまれるような、明快な決定を強要するのを避けた。各省庁から集めた要素を一つにまとめげて、すべての省庁を政策議論における勝者にしようと考えていたのだ。（P393）

ライスのNSC運営については、他にも言いたいことがあった。会議がきちんと準備されていないことが多いのだ。直前になって時間や議題が変更になるので、参加者は十分準備ができない上に、忙しい予定を再調整するのに苦労した。（中略）会議の決定事項については、NSCスタッフが、当然、要約を書くことになっている。しかし、その要約は大雑把で、私の記憶と一致しないこともあった。（中略）そのせいでNSCで何が話し合われたのか、何が決議されたのかを関連する執行省庁が知ることが出来なくなってしまった。NSCで何が決まり、次に何をすべきかについて、参加者の見方が異なることもあった。そのため、CIA、国務省、国防総省の高官は持ち場に戻り、自分たちが最善だと思うことをやってしまった。（P394）

これが真実だとしたならば、ラムちゃんはもっと怒って良いと思う。まぁ、この辺についてはラムちゃん自身「ライスは大学教授出身だから」「子ブッシュの意向もあるに違いない」と書いていますが、世界の超大国であるアメリカのトップ、しかもその外交政策で重要な会議運営がこれで良いんかいっ!?と突っ込みをいれたくなり、そして「よくまぁ、なんとかなったよな」と思わんでもないです。なんとかならなかった問題も山積みで、それが直接アフガンとイラクの政策についての問題にも繋がっているのだから、会議運営の恐ろしさが身に沁みて判ります。私の主催する会議で国の運命が決まる事はありませんが、気を付けたい。

パウエルとの仲も中々なもんで、非軍人のライス、元軍人のラムちゃんという考え方の違いが上記のような問題を引き起こすならば、同じ軍人同士もっと話が上手くいくんじゃね？と考えがちですが、そうは問屋がおろさない。パウエルが国連でイラクの大量破壊兵器について演説したことは有名ですが、その前に国防総省はテロリスト達がいるとされたイラクのクーマルという町を攻撃すべきと主張してました。が、パウエルが

「それでは私の演説が台無しになってしまう」

と反対して演説中にクーマルについて「テロリストの施設は判っている」と場所までいっちゃったもんだから、テロリストは演説後直ぐに逃げ出して全く意味が無くなった！とラムちゃんはお怒り。なんせ、ラムちゃんの記憶では

　二月三日、ニューヨークへ向かう二日前に、パウエルはNCSの席で大統領にプレゼンテーションの概要を示した。「全て裏はとってあります」。パウエルは自信に満ちていた。（P526）

なのに、

ところが、いつのまにか、パウエルはただ騙されて、国連安理保と世界に向けて誤った声明を出したという物語が出来上がっていた。（P529）

のだから。そりゃ、アメリカ合衆国という民主主義国家のなかで、他の省庁との会議の場（しかも、それははっきりした意見が決まり難い調和型会議）も何度となくあり、決断を下す最高責任者（大統領）でもないのに、気が付いたら自分だけが戦犯扱いされちゃたまりません。２度目ですが、正直これが真実だとしたらラムちゃんはもっと怒って良いと思う。

②法律戦争について

数年前には日本の司法が左翼化しており、その判決を憂う本を読みましたが、司法について頭が痛いのはどの国も同じようです。（最近は日本でも万引きして捕まった元女教諭へもの凄い金額を支払う判決が出たりしてましたね….なんなの、あれ。）特にラムちゃんの場合、「冷蔵庫を背負うレースに出たら身体を痛めた。冷蔵庫に「背負っちゃ駄目」って書いていないからだ」だとか「マクドナルドの椅子にオシリが入らなかった」とか嘘かホントかアホみたいな訴訟天国であるアメリカ合衆国の司法だけでなく、国際法やら他国が勝手に決めた「外国人でも裁く！」法律やらも相手にしなくてはいけないのだから、本当に気の毒です。ただ、涙目になってじっと耐えるのは我々のラムちゃんではありません。「ちょっと体育館裏来いや」のノリで他国の国防相を呼び出し、法律を変えさせちゃうシカゴっ子ラムちゃんが我らのラムちゃんです。

一九九〇年代、ベルギーの国会は、戦争犯罪や大量虐殺、その他、人道に反する犯罪について、その行為が世界中のどこでなされようとも裁くことが可能な裁判権を、国の裁判所に与える法律を制定した。これは普遍的管轄権といい、世界各地のどの裁判所でも、嫌疑のかかった不法行為が国際法違反と評されたら、アメリカ国民ー軍人も民間人もーであれ誰であれ、裁判にかけることができるとしている。（P685）

この法律に対してラムちゃん、ベルギーの国防相をNATOの理事会後、別室に呼び出し

早い話、サダム・フセインを逮捕して裁判にかけようというような努力をベルギー人がしていたという記憶が、私にはないのだが、と。（中略）ベルギー政府が世界最古の軍事同盟であるNATOの本部として機能を果たしていることを誇るのは当然だ。しかしこの際いっておくけれど、NATOがブリュッセルにあるのは、一九六六年にフランス大統領のシャルル・ド・ゴールがNATO本部をフランスから追い出したからだ。もしベルギーが同様に自国の領土からアメリカ人が出てきたくなるような法律を施行するつもりなら、我が国がNATO本部を再び移転させてはいけない理由などないと強く主張した。（P687）

と思いっきり恐喝？し、２ヶ月もしないうちに法律を破棄させたというお茶目っぷり。アメリカのヨーロッパでのプレゼンスを見せつける事件でもありました。

司法のことは専門外なので良くわかりませんが、政府内や議会でも色んな主義主張があるのに、司法だけは公平性がある、と信じるのは絶対におかしい。裁判官や陪審員も人間である以上、右寄り左寄り、社会主義、フェミニスト等色んな考えが反映される訳で、憲法の解釈だって「定説」はあるけど「正解」が決まっていないのだから、「司法即ち公平で正しい」という幻想は、ラムちゃんでなくとも捨て去った方がよいでしょうね。

③ラムちゃんの業務スタイルその他

普段は立って仕事をする派のラムちゃん、ニクソン時代は「黄禍」とよばれ、フォードや子ブッシュ時代は「雪片」と呼ばれるメモ魔です。きちんと書面に残す派らしい。あら、意外。ただ、解説にも触れられていた通り、文章として残っているからこの自叙伝もとんでもなく細かく、「もー、ラムちゃんのいう事が正しい！」と信じてしまいそうな空気を醸し出しているんでしょう。ライスも早くNCS＆国務長官時代の自叙伝を書けば良いのに。同じ出来事に対する二つの視点を見比べるのもまた楽しい事だと思うのです。特に私自身、子ブッシュの時代は丁度大学〜アメリカ留学中で、国際関係を専攻してた事もあり、閣僚の面々は非常に馴染み深いもの。ラムちゃんの自伝は逆立ちしてもラムちゃんの自伝でしかないのですが、それでもやっぱり私にとってひたすら本を読み、勉強していた幸福な時代の象徴なのでした。

またラムちゃん自身については、軍人一本気というか、筋の通ったある意味非常にわかり易い性格であることがこの本から良くわかります。まずはアメリカ合衆国のため、良いものはよい、悪いものは悪いと判断し、その判断は貫かれ、そしてそれが過ちであった場合は素直に認める。イラク戦争などで悪者扱いされていますが、個人的には非常に好感の持てる人物です。

900ページは冗談なしに重く、通勤や通学中の読書にはお薦め出来ませんが、一読の価値はありです。

私のハンドルネームのフルネームが「幕の内ゆきを」である事を知っている人は少ないでしょうね・・・ふふふ

と意味深に始めてみましたが、実はaboutの上の方にちゃんと書いてあったりするのです。aboutページを自ら作っておきながら、「こんなもん、別に読まんでも良い」とaboutページに書いてあったりするので、ま、ハンドルネームのフルネームについて、知らなくとも全く構わない、と。ただ、タイトルの語呂的にフルネームの方がシックリきたと、そう言う訳です。

さて、私生活の方は相変わらずです。忙しいといえば、忙しい。ただ、最近は忙しさにかまけて、読書の方を怠っていたので、猛反省して沢山読もうと心に誓っているところです。取り急ぎ、「佐藤優の本を制覇する」という野望を達成すべく、本のリストを作成中です。他にも読みたい本はいっぱい。スターリンとかヒトラーとか、中国共産党（特に周恩来）とかそっち系。あと、国際関係と地政学、読書論、書評の本も読みたいな。そして、毛色が変わるけれども、全米大ヒットの映画「トワイライト」の原作も読んでみたい・・・まぁ、この本は原語で読んでも良いのかも知れないのですけれど。因みに映画そのものについては「エドワード役のロバート・パティンソンはそこまでイケてない」という、ファンのほとんどを敵に回すような感想を抱きました。なんかねー、知り合いに似ているんですよね、あの髪型。しょーもない理由でご免なさい。

んで、「毛沢東の私生活」を旅行中に読み終わったのですが、なんていうのか想像通りでございました、毛主席の私生活って。禁欲を訴える中での女遊び、貧困の中での豪華な料理、パラノイア・・・などなど、「ま、共産党の独裁的主導者ってこんなもんよね」というのが私の感想です。ちょっと内容に関して不満を言えば、もうちょっとくらい文化革命について記述があっても良かったのでは？と。他の政治闘争に比べて、えらくサラッと流された気がします。劉少奇の最後については、確か３行くらいしかなかったぞ。もっと書けば良いのに。その辺の内容の配分からも、また、個々のエピソードからも微妙に筆者の立ち位置が分かるような、分からないような・・・ハッキリ言ってしまえば「筆者自身も、生い立ちの不利をカバーするだけの、毛沢東の主治医としての権威を持っていた」という点がこの本では微妙に隠れているのですよね。そりゃ、共産党権力の中枢では振り回される側に立っていた事は間違いないのでしょうが、中国国民と比べた立ち位置についてはそんなに触れていなかったりする訳です。別にそれでどうこうなる訳ではありませんが、曇った目で読んだので、凄くその辺の違和感を感じてしまいました。もう少し、本を素直に読める人になりたいよ。

それにしても、筆者の「江青嫌い」には笑ってしまうほどでした。まぁ、江青側に問題のほとんどの責任があるのでしょうが・・・同じ共産党独裁者の奥さんとして、江青はナジェージダ・アリルーエワ（スターリンの２番目の奥さん）の爪の垢でも煎じて飲めば良かったんだ。

ラフレシアを火炎放射砲で焼き払いました。人間、どんなにお脳でお花畑を咲かせても、昨日今日と一人で過ごしちゃ意味がないんだぜ、ということを身をもって学習しました。新宿の伊勢丹の凄さ（特に1階とケーキのある地下1階）といったら・・・ふっ。「アメリカの戦闘ヘリ」とニュースで流れたら間髪入れず「アパッチ！」と叫び、好きな四字熟語（熟語、ではないかもしれないけれど）が「機甲師団（←響きが）」と「諸行無常」の私が蘇りました。はい、拍手〜！

というおバカなことはさておき、早速硬派な話題に移りましょう。まず、旅のお供に新幹線の中で読んだ雑誌、Wedgeについて。前回の旅の最中に読んだ時も思ったのですが、この雑誌は意外と最初のコラムに大物が多い！この前はSAIS（正式名称：ポール・ニッツ高等国際研究所）のケント・カルダーだったし、今回はリチャード・アーミテージなんだもの。どちらも日米同盟について語っておりましたが、これはそういう枠なんですかね？他にも読み応えの多い記事があるので、旅の御供にぜひどうぞ。東海道・山陽新幹線内キヨスク、沿線売店、一部書店で取り扱っているそうです。・・・肝心のコラムの内容？そりゃ勿論、両方共に「うち、来年政権変わっちゃうけど、これからも末永くヨロシクね☆」ですよ。どちらも似たようなことを書いていましたが、個人的にはアーミテージのコラムに一度しか「中国」って言葉が出てこなかったのに注目しました。しかも、それは６者協議の参加国のリスト内のみ。・・・もしかして、ワザと避けたのか？「アメリカはアジアの国なんだぜ！」という純アジア国からしてみると「えっ・・・？そうなの？どの辺が？」って思っちゃうような宣言から始まり、「だからアジアの中での（自分とアジア国との）同盟が大切なの！」と続き、「特にインド洋って、日本的にもアメリカ的にも大事じゃない？」と言いつつ、「ま、今すぐはアジアにおける安保体制をバシッと決めずに、流動的でもいいんじゃない？」と結論を先延ばしにするのか・・・と期待させて、「あ、でもやっぱり、日本とインドの同盟って良くね？」で終わるという、要は「インドとも仲良くしてね」っていう提案をしたいらしい内容なんですけど、中国はどうした！？あれは無視出来ないと思うんだけど。字数の関係で無視したのか、大人の都合で無視したのか、非常に気になります。

新幹線絡みでもう一つ。子供が出来たら、絶対に一度日本地図片手に窓の外を流れる景色と地名（川の名前とか）を一通り確認したい。結構楽しいと思うんだ、これ。大井川とか浜名湖とか、直ぐに覚えることが出来そう・・・因みにどうでも良いですが、わたしゃ今回の旅で東海道新幹線米原〜京都間、上りだと右側に古墳が２つほど見えることを発見しました。新幹線に乗った時は是非探してみて下さい。

さて、国際関係に話を戻してしまいます。今読んでいる本（ほぼ読了）は『「戦争学」概論（黒野耐：著）』なんですけど、地政学から大まかな戦争史までカバーしていて、入門書には最適な感じ。ただし、参考文献として巻末にリストアップされている、その筋では有名な本（奥山真司の「地政学」とか、マハンとかブレジンスキーとかケナンとか、あとはクラちゃん（クラウゼヴィッツ）の「戦争論」とか）を既に読んでいる人には多分、物足りない。まぁ、講談社現代新書だもの、入門書として良ければいいんじゃないの？と上から目線で語ってみました。

ただ、この本、笑いどころがありまして、どうも筆者の黒野氏は現状の日本の政府や中国に物申したいことがあるらしく、唐突に章の最後で持論を「ボソッ」と置いていくんですね。例えば、レーガン大統領の対ソ連の方針とそれに続くソ連崩壊。これは結局、核戦力が拮抗し、ソ連とアメリカの純粋な経済格差（民主主義vs共産主義と、イデオロギーの差でもあるわけですが）が冷戦の勝敗を決したともいえるものなんですけど、クラちゃんの戦争論にも絡めて、冷戦ってのは「政治」そのものの戦いだったよね、と章を閉めるかと思えば、最後の段落で

こうしてみると、民主主義の総本山、唯一の超大国アメリカに挑戦する、経済は資本主義で政治は共産主義という国の結末がどうなるかは、見えているように思えるのだが。

っていきなり中国についてチクリと嫌みを言っています。いや、中国の行く末は我ながら見物だと思うけど、このタイミングで中国ですか？先生・・・と突っ込みたかったんですよ、私は。ニクソンなら兎も角、レーガンの時代と中国って実はあんまり一緒に語られないもの。他にも、イラク戦争からフセインの戦略眼の無さに話が移って、最後の一文が

もっとも、フセインほどではないにしても責任感、プレッシャー、願望などによって、国の指導者といえどもこうした傾向に陥りがちなことは肝に銘じておくべきだ。かつての大日本帝国がそうであったように。

と来るんですね・・・ここまで来ると私、ネット界隈を賑わせた天声人語の

そういえば、自らの国家や民族に固執する右翼系の若者が世界的に増えているという事実も、多少気になるところだが。

を思い出すと言うかさ、まぁ、内容的には真逆でしょうけど、論理の吹っ飛び方っていうかさ、似てません？ちょっと笑ったぞ・・・

最後に余談。最初の段落を書いている時点で「ガミラスは蘇る、何度でも！」という台詞を思い出したというか思いついたんですが、これ、元は「ラピュタは蘇るさ！」っていうムスカ大佐の台詞だったんですよね。どこで混ざっちゃたんだろう？まぁ、似てますもんね、デスラー総統とムスカ大佐って。特にあの、前髪で隠しきれていない広いオデコとかさ。どっちも好きですけどね。

さて、大分ブログ執筆に関してのリハビリが進んできました。結局書くことが大好きなんだもんね、私。ブログじゃ食ってけませんが、時間の許す限り書いていきたい。「お花畑は消しちゃ駄目ぇ〜」って母に言われたけど、ブログに関してはもう遅い。文庫の方のアップはまた明日。

コ、コソボが独立したっ！！（←ソースは英語）

なんていうのか、バルカンは専門範囲外だったので、全然気にしていなかったのです。（広い意味では専門ですけど、狭い意味では東アジアの安全保障問題（含・ロシア＆アメリカ）なのです、一応。）セルビアは制裁する意向のようですね・・・さて、どうなることやら。因みにバルカン半島と言えばやっぱり旧ユーゴスラビア側が有名ですけど、個人的には逆側（ルーマニアとか）も結構ややっこしい歴史があって苦手です。第一次世界大戦の参戦過程とか３回読んでやっと理解出来たし。大戦後の歴史は未だに理解出来てないし！ややっこしいことこの上ないですけど、結構重要な地域だからちゃんと押さえておきたいです。あ、後どうでも良いですけど、新しいコソボの国旗は結構カッコいいですね。日章旗は兎も角、私のお気に入りであるブータンの国旗と良い勝負です。そういや、歴史の授業で第一次世界大戦後の国境問題についてやってたんですけど、「ルーマニアの北西部には誰が住んでいたか？」という質問に対して、「ヴァンパイア」と答えるアメリカ人、嫌いじゃないぜ・・・（本当の答えはハンガリー系）

ウィルソン大統領のリサーチはとうとう「対華２１ヶ条の要求」まで進みました。ここでもやっぱり人種差別問題が絡んでます。「日本がカリフォルニアの排日運動の件について黙るんだったら、南満州くらいくれてやった方が得じゃね？」とか言っている政府高官もいましたし・・・それと、この時点で既に「第一次世界大戦の後は日米戦争」と予測している人が多いという点。イギリスの様子を伝える手紙（電報かも）では「まぁぶっちゃけ、イギリス人は日英同盟そんなに好きじゃないようですよ」とか報告していますし、「この戦争が終わったら、ドイツ、ロシア、日本が同盟を組むかもしれない」と考えている人もチラホラ。こうやってみると、日米間の戦争は根が深いんですよね・・・後、アメリカの対中政策である「門戸開放」なんですけど、あるときはアメリカの純粋な利権追求に使われ、またあるときは中国人に対する人道的思想に使われ、定義が結構アヤフヤであるように思えます。どうもこの辺は、F・ローズベルトの親中政策、そして今の民主党まで、思想的影響がある気がするので、もう少しちゃんと調べてみたいです。出来れば、ローズベルトの資料も（今やっているみたいに）全てさらってみたいなぁ。因みに、今のところウィルソン大統領に対する私の印象は「八方美人」、これに尽きます。

んで、今までに観た映画の感想。沢山あるから簡潔に。

１）大いなる幻影
フランス映画の方です。英語字幕で観たのでいまいち掴めたような掴めなかったような感じなんです。かの有名な「この戦争（第一次世界大戦）は貴族の終わり」というシーンはさておき、「フランス人の貴族って、あれ？ナポレオン後の出戻り組？」とか自身の知識の無さがネックだったとでも申しましょうか・・・「貴族は教養がある＝フランス人貴族とドイツ人貴族が英語で会話をする（下流の人間には理解出来ない）」というその当時の身分社会を示すシーンでも「あ、あれっ！？字幕が消えた！・・・ン、英語で喋ってるのか？」とアタフタしたし。極めつけは、キャラクターの区別がつかなかった事。主人公の一人であるフランス人貴族を私は当初、「タラン（整形前）」と識別していたんですが、沢山いたよ・・・タランが・・・orz

２）戦艦ポチョムキン
この映画についてクラスの前で発表しなくてはいけなかったので、なかなか感想らしい感想が無いのですが、意外とあれこれ暗喩的な部分が多いのでそういった目線でみると楽しいと思います。階段を転がり落ちる乳母車は有名ですね、はい。

３）嘆きの天使
ドイツ人が英語で喋っているバージョンを観たので「大いなる幻影」以上に色々大変だったのですが、一緒に観た人が漏れなくド鬱になったというくら〜い映画。主人公の落ちぶれ方が第一次世界大戦前後のドイツを暗に意味しているとも取れるし、また同時に、知識人の凋落とも取れるかと・・・しかし、本当にくら〜い映画です。

４）博士の異常な愛情、または私は如何にして心配するのを止めて水爆を愛するようになったか
思ったよりも短い映画。やっぱりキューブリック好きです。個人的には「ピンクパンサー」でも有名なピーター・セラーズが良い演技（３役）かと・・・偶然の偶然が積み重なって、核戦争へ突入していく様はホント、怖くなります。良く５０年近くそのような偶然が起こらなかったものだ・・・そう考えると核の拡散というのはなんとしても阻止すべきことだと思いませんか？

最後にどうでも良いんですが、歴史の授業では、もうそろそろナチスに突入するんですね。んで、ナチスに関する論文集を読んでいるのですが、やれ「ヒトラーは自殺願望があった」「誇大妄想癖だ」「マゾだ」「本読んでいるって『我が闘争』に書いてるけど、あれ、全部ウソ」「近親相姦の性癖がある」etc…ともの凄い。歴史に名を（良い意味であれ、悪名としてであれ）残すというのは、考えものだなと思いました。ま、後世の人間だからこそ好き勝手言えるのですけどね。